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INTRODUCTION

“‘Valuation is . . . necessarily an approximation.’
It is an inexact science at best.”1
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) first officially sanctioned a
charitable income tax deduction for the donation of a conservation easement
in 1964.2 In 1980, Congress enacted § 170(h), which authorizes a deduction
for the donation of a conservation easement or a façade easement that is
“granted in perpetuity” to a government entity or charitable organization
“exclusively for conservation purposes.”3 The deduction has encouraged
thousands of property owners to donate easements that protect land and
historic structures with important conservation and historic values. The
deduction has also, however, been subject to abuse, including valuation
abuse.4
That the deduction has been subject to valuation abuse is unsurprising.
Valuing conservation and façade easements presents difficult challenges.
Because such easements are partial interests in property that are not bought
and sold in open markets, they generally must be valued indirectly using the
before and after method, pursuant to which the value of an easement is equal
to the difference between the fair market value of the subject property
immediately before and immediately after the donation of the easement.5
1. Stanley Works v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 389, 408 (1986) (citing
Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976)).
2. See Rev. Rul. 64–205, 1964-2 C.B. 62.
3. I.R.C. § 170(h) (1980). As a general rule, this Article refers to
easements encumbering land as conservation easements and easements encumbering
historic structures as façade easements.
4. For reports of abuse, see, e.g., DEPT. OF TREASURY, GENERAL
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS,
188–92
(Feb.
2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf [hereinafter 2016 REVENUE
PROPOSALS]; Jennie Lay, Conservation Easement Conundrums, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Mar. 31, 2008; Joe Stephens, IRS Starts Team on Easement Abuses, WASH.
POST, June 9, 2005, at A06; Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find
Payoff in Preservation, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2003, at A01; Joe Stephens, Loophole
Pays Off On Upscale Buildings, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2004, at A01; Conservation
Easements: Abusive Transactions Involving Charitable Contributions of Easements,
IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Conservation-Easements.
5. See Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(i); see also, e.g., Hughes v. Commissioner,
97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1488, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at 703 (“because
conservation easements are typically granted by deed or gift rather than sold,
comparable sales [of easements] are rarely available. As an alternative, the so-called
before-and-after approach is often used” (citation omitted)).
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Easements are also subject to a range of arguable values under the before and
after method, and the boundary between reasonably supportable and abusive
values is blurred.6 These factors, coupled with the lack of negotiation with
respect to valuation in the context of a charitable contribution, present a
problem for the IRS. Unless and until an audit is conducted, the IRS must rely
on a one-sided assertion of value by taxpayers who have a financial incentive
to assert the highest value they think they can get away with.7
In 2006, in part in response to a series of Washington Post articles
alleging a variety of abuses in the easement donation context, the IRS began
aggressively auditing and litigating deductions claimed for conservation and
façade easement donations. Over the past ten years, the courts have issued
more than seventy-five opinions in this context, which is an astonishing
amount of case law for such a specific charitable deduction provision. This
case law reveals a variety of abuses, including persistent overvaluation of
easements, failures to properly substantiate the claimed deductions, and
failures to comply with the requirements of § 170(h) and the Regulations,
which are designed to ensure that tax-deductible easements protect properties
with unique or otherwise significant conservation or historic values8 and that
the protections will be durable.9

6. See, e.g., Scheidelman v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir.
2014) (“‘[I]t is not necessary that the value arrived at by the trial court be a figure as
to which there is specific testimony, if it is within the range of figures that may
properly be deduced from the evidence.’”) (quoting Silverman, 538 F.2d at 933).
7. See Kingsbury Browne, Jr., Taxes as a Form of Public Financing:
Treasury’s Open Space Protection Program, in LAND-SAVING ACTION: A WRITTEN
SYMPOSIUM BY 29 EXPERTS ON PRIVATE LAND CONVERSATION IN THE 1980S at 147,
149 (Russell L. Brenneman & Sarah M. Bates eds. 1984) (providing that hard
bargaining and use of independent appraisers by both sides are not elements of the
Treasury’s deductibility program unless and until the landowner’s tax return is
audited).
8. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4) (providing the four conservation purposes for
which tax-deductible easements may be donated); see also S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 19802 C.B. 599, at 603 (stating that the § 170(h) deduction “should be directed at the
preservation of unique or otherwise significant land areas or structures”).
9. See I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C), (h)(5)(A) (“granted in perpetuity” and
“protected in perpetuity” requirements); Reg. §§ 1.170A–14(c) (eligible donee and
restriction on transfer requirements), 1.170A-14(e) (no inconsistent use requirement),
1.170A-14(g) (enforceable in perpetuity requirements). See also S. Rep. No. 96-1007,
1980-2 C.B. 599, at 605 (“The bill retains the present law requirement that
contributions be made “exclusively for conservation purposes.” Moreover, the bill
explicitly provides that this requirement is not satisfied unless the conservation
purpose is protected in perpetuity.”).
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Although Congress enacted some modest reforms in 2006,10 it also
temporarily enhanced the tax benefits offered to easement donors by making
the percentage limitations on the § 170(h) deduction significantly more
favorable.11 Congress then repeatedly extended those enhanced incentives,12
and in 2015 made the enhanced incentives a permanent part of the Code.13 In
making the enhanced incentives permanent, Congress turned a blind eye to the
abuses revealed by the case law, as well as to Treasury Department proposals
to implement further reforms to curb abuses.14 However, given the significant
cost of the incentives,15 the continued expenditure of administrative and
10. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780,
§§ 1213, 1219 (2006) (revising § 170(h) to impose additional requirements with
regard to façade easement donations, expanding the circumstances under which
penalties can be imposed for overvaluing charitable contributions generally, and
adding requirements regarding the “qualified appraisals” that must be used to
substantiate values claimed with regard to charitable contributions).
11. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1206. As a general rule, a landowner
can claim the deduction generated by an easement donation to the extent of 30 percent
of the landowner’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in each of the year of the donation
and the following five years. Based on the changes made in 2006, which were
temporary, easement donors were permitted to claim the resulting deduction to the
extent of 50 percent of the donor’s AGI in each of the year of the donation and the
following 15 years, or, for qualifying farmer and rancher donations, 100 percent of the
donor’s AGI for the 16-year period. See J. COMM. TAX’N, JCX-38-06, TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE “PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006,” at 275–77 (Aug.
3, 2006) [hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF PPA].
12. See, e.g., Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, §
106, 128 Stat. 4011, (Dec. 19, 2014).
13. RULES COMM., 114TH CONG. TEXT OF H. AMEND. #2 TO THE S. AMEND.
TO H.R. 2029, MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND VETERANS AFFAIRS AND RELATED
AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2016 §111 (Comm. Print 2015) (also allowing
Alaska Native Corporations donating conservation easements to claim the resulting
deduction to the extent of 100 percent of taxable income in each of the year of the
donation and the following 15 years, beginning in 2016).
14. See, e.g., 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 189 (“Court cases
over the last decade have highlighted donors who have taken large deductions for
overvalued easements and for easements that allow donors to retain significant rights
or that do not further important conservation purposes.”).
15. See J. COMM. TAX’N, JCX-143-15, ESTIMATED REVENUE BUDGET
EFFECTS OF DIVISION Q OF AMENDMENT #2 TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R.
2029 (RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 114-40), “THE “PROTECTING AMERICANS FROM TAX
HIKES ACT OF 2015” (Dec. 16, 2015) (estimating that the enhanced incentives will cost
taxpayers, on average, an additional $118 million annually over the next ten years);
Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: Design Flaws, Enforcement Challenges,
and Reform, 3 Utah L. Rev. 755, 756 (2013) (estimating that individual federal
taxpayers invested $4.2 billion in conservation easements over the eight-year period
from 2003 to 2010 through the federal charitable income tax deduction program);
Conservation Easements, EO TAX J. 2014-205, Oct. 16, 2014 (ed. Paul Streckfus) (in
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judicial resources on enforcement, and the likelihood that the enhanced
incentives will exacerbate abuses, calls for reform can be expected to continue
and to become more acute.16
To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the case law
involving alleged overvaluation of conservation and façade easements for §
170(h) deduction purposes. This Article fills that void. It examines the
easement valuation case law over the past five decades (through 2015) and
discusses the most common methods by which taxpayers or, more precisely,
their appraisers overvalue easements. It also proposes reforms informed by the
lessons learned from the case law.
This Article does not address the equally, if not more important body
of case law in which taxpayers have been denied deductions because the
easements they donated failed to satisfy one or more of the requirements of §
170(h) and the Regulations.17 That body of case law will be the subject of a
separate article. For purposes of this Article, it is important to note that
ensuring that conservation and façade easements are accurately valued at the
time of their donation would not guarantee that the public’s money is being
well spent. Additional reforms are needed to ensure that the easements protect
properties that have important conservation or historic values, and that those
protections will not be lost through, for example, lack of enforcement or the
comments delivered to members of the American Bar Association Section of
Taxation’s Exempt Organizations Committee, Ruth Madrigal, Attorney-Advisor,
Office of Tax Policy, Department of Treasury, noted that the program is costing
federal taxpayers an estimated $600 million annually).
16. See Diane Freda, Good and Bad of Permanent Exempt Extenders: More
Scrutiny, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Jan. 20, 2016, at G-3 (“Now that certain tax-exempt
extenders have been made permanent, they may actually face more scrutiny that could
lead to either expansion or curtailment.”).
17. See, e.g., Belk v. Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (failure
to satisfy granted in perpetuity requirement); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d
1243 (10th Cir. 2015) (failure to satisfy mortgage subordination requirement); Graev
v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 377 (2013) (conditional gift of easement not deductible);
Turner v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 299 (2006) (failure to satisfy open space or historic
preservation conservation purposes tests); Atkinson v. Commissioner, 110 T.C.M.
(CCH) 550, 2015 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2015-236, at 1695 (failure to satisfy habitat or open
space conservation purposes tests); Bosque Canyon Ranch, L.P. v. Commissioner, 110
T.C.M. (CCH) 48, 2015 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2015-130, at 993 (failure to satisfy granted
in perpetuity and baseline documentation requirements); Carpenter v. Commissioner,
106 T.C.M. (CCH) 62, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013-172, at 1393 (failure to satisfy
judicial extinguishment requirement); RP Golf, LLC v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M.
(CCH) 413, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-282, at 1977 (failure to satisfy open space
conservation purpose test); Herman v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 197, 2009
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-205, at 1539 (failure to satisfy historic preservation conservation
purpose test).
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substantial modification, release, or termination of the easements. In other
words, any reforms in the easement deduction context should also include
measures designed to ensure both the quality and the durability of the
easements.
To set the stage for discussion of the valuation case law, Part II
describes the rules governing the valuation of easements for purposes of the §
170(h) deduction. Part III describes the penalties that may be imposed on
taxpayers who overstate the value of easements on their tax returns, as well as
the penalties that may be imposed on the appraisers who assist them in doing
so. Parts IV and V then analyze the forty-five cases through 2015 that involved
challenges to the valuation of façade easements and conservation easements,
respectively. The façade easement and conservation easement cases are
analyzed separately because the two types of easements involve different
valuation issues. Informed by the insights from the case law, Part VI offers
suggestions for reform. Appendices A and B set forth relevant information
regarding the façade easement valuation cases, and Appendices C and D
contain similar information with respect to the conservation easement
valuation cases.
II.

VALUATION RULES

Taxpayers interested in claiming deductions for the donation of façade
easements or conservation easements must comply with easement-specific
valuation rules set forth in the Regulations as well as generally accepted
appraisal standards.18 Compliance with generally accepted appraisal standards
is mandated by the substantiation and reporting requirements for charitable
contribution deductions generally.19
A.

Sales of Comparable Easements

The Regulations interpreting § 170(h) provide that the value of the
charitable contribution of an easement is the fair market value of the easement
at the time of the contribution.20 “Fair market value” is defined for these
purposes as “the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
18. See Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3) for the easement-specific valuation rules.
19. A conservation easement donor claiming a deduction for an easement
with a value of more than $5,000 (which almost always will be the case) must
substantiate the deduction with a “qualified appraisal” prepared by a “qualified
appraiser.” See I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(C); Reg. § 1.170A–13(c). A qualified appraisal
must, among other things, be prepared in accordance with “generally accepted
appraisal standards.” I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(i)(II).
20. See Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(i).
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or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”21 The
Regulations also provide that, if “a substantial record of sales of easements
comparable to the donated easement (such as purchases pursuant to a
governmental program)” is “available to use as a meaningful or valid
comparison,” then the fair market value of the donated easement must be based
on the sales prices of such comparable easements.22 Accordingly, this “sales
of comparable easements” method is the preferred method of valuation.
However, because conservation and façade easements are not bought and sold
in true market transactions,23 and an easement’s restrictions and the underlying
property generally will be unique in some if not many respects, 24 the sales of
comparable easements method is rarely (if ever) used.25
B.

Before and After Method

Because the Treasury recognized the difficulties associated with
attempting to value easements by reference to sales of comparable easements,
the Regulations provide an alternative method of valuation. If “no substantial
record of market-place sales is available to use as a meaningful or valid
comparison, as a general rule (but not necessarily in all cases),” donors should
determine the value of their easements using the before and after method.26 A
before and after easement appraisal involves two estimates of value: (i) one of
the fair market value of the subject property immediately before the donation,
21. See id.; Reg. § 1.170A–1(c)(2).
22. See Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(i).
23. See Browning v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 303, 312 (1997) (the record
of sales from a county’s easement purchase program was not “available to use as a
meaningful or valid comparison” because the sales were bargain-sales, not true market
transactions).
24. See Trout Ranch, LLC v. Commissioner (Trout Ranch I), 100 T.C.M.
(CCH) 581, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-283, at 1717, aff’d Trout Ranch, LLC v.
Commissioner (Trout Ranch II), 493 Fed. Appx. 944 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting “sales
of comparable easements” method because the purportedly comparable easements and
the lands they encumbered were different from the easement at issue and the property
it encumbered).
25. In none of the cases analyzed for this Article did the courts rely on the
sales of comparable easements method in determining the value of the donated
easement. See, e.g., James Boyd et al., The Law and Economics of Habitat
Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 209, 234 (“Because there is no conventional market for easements, the usual
procedure for valuing an asset—simple observation of an equilibrium market price
resulting from a large volume of transactions— cannot be followed.”).
26. See Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(i); see also S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 1980-2
C.B. 599, at 606.
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or what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the property before it is
encumbered by the easement’s perpetual restrictions (the “before-value”), and
(ii) one of fair market value of the subject property immediately after the
donation, or what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the property
after it is encumbered by the easement’s perpetual restrictions (the “aftervalue”).27 In each case, the fair market value of the subject property must be
evaluated considering the property’s highest and best use.28
1.

Before-Value

The first step in estimating the before-value of the subject property is
determining the highest and best use of the property unrestricted by the
easement.29 A property's “highest and best use” is “the highest and most
profitable use for which [the property] is adaptable and needed or likely to be
needed in the reasonably near future.”30 Highest and best use has also been
defined as “[t]he reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an
improved property that is physically possible, appropriately supported, and
financially feasible and that results in the highest value,”31 or the use that is
physically possible, legally permissible, financially feasible, and maximally
productive.32
Valuation does not depend on “whether the owner actually has put the
property to its highest and best use.”33 As one court explained: “The landowner
‘may have used a valuable corner [of property] for a stable or for a pigsty . . .
[but] he is not obliged to have it priced on that basis.’”34 However, a property’s

27. See, e.g., Thayer v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504, T.C.M. (PH) ¶ 77,370 (1977) (“This valuation procedure involves traditional real estate
valuation principles, except it is necessary to derive two valuations rather than one.”).
28. See Hilborn v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 677, 689–90 (1985); Reg. §
1.170A–14(h)(3)(i), (ii).
29. Hilborn, 85 T.C. at 689.
30. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1490, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094 at
702–03 (2009).
31. Whitehouse Hotel L.P. v. Commissioner (Whitehouse III), 139 T.C.
304, 331 (2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded by 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir.
2014).
32. Esgar Corp. v. Commissioner (Esgar II), 744 F.3d 648, 659 n.10 (10th
Cir. 2014).
33. Id. at 657 (citing Symington v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 892, 896
(1986)).
34. Stanley Works, 87 T.C. at 400 (citing Central Georgia Power Co. v.
Stone, 77 S.E. 565, 567 (1913)).
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highest and best use is presumed to be the use to which the property is currently
being put absent proof to the contrary.35
When a proposed highest and best use differs from the property’s
current use, the taxpayer must demonstrate both “‘closeness in time’ and
‘reasonable probability’” of the proposed use.36 Physical suitability of the
property for the proposed use is not sufficient; the taxpayer must establish that
there existed a reasonable probability the property would be so used in the
reasonably near future.37 In other words, there must be some objective support
of future demand for the proposed use.38
Proposed uses that “depend upon events or combinations of
occurrences which, while within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown
to be reasonably probable” must be excluded from consideration.39 The
question to be asked is whether it would be reasonable to conclude that a
hypothetical willing buyer would have considered the property as the site for
the proposed use at the time of the easement’s donation. If a hypothetical buyer
would not reasonably have taken into account the proposed use in agreeing to
purchase the property, such proposed use should not be considered in valuing
the property.40
The Regulations incorporate and supplement these general appraisal
principles. The Regulations provide that “the fair market value of the property
before contribution of the [easement] must take into account not only the
current use of the property but also an objective assessment of how immediate
or remote the likelihood is that the property, absent the restriction, would in
fact be developed.”41 The 10th Circuit noted that “[t]his is the same as asking
a court to determine the reasonable probability that development is ‘likely to
be needed in the reasonably near future.’”42 The Regulations also provide that
fair market value of the property before contribution of the easement must take
into account “any effect from zoning, conservation, or historic preservation
35. Mountanos v. Commissioner, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 2013 T.C.M.
(RIA) ¶ 2013-138, at 1185, motion for reconsideration denied, 107 T.C.M. (CCH)
1211, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2014-038, at 305.
36. Esgar II, 744 F.3d. at 658.
37. Stanley Works, 87 T.C. at 401.
38. Esgar Corp. v. Commissioner (Esgar I), 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1185, 1190,
2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-035, at 274 (2012), aff’d Esgar II, 744 F.3d 648.
39. Id.
40. Stanley Works, 87 T.C. at 402; see also Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 332
(“Even if . . . a potential use is profitable and . . . the property is adaptable for that use,
that use is not necessarily the measure of the value of the property. Instead, it is to be
considered to the extent the prospect of demand for the use affects market value.”).
41. Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(ii).
42. Esgar II, 744 F.3d. at 658 (citing Symington, 87 T.C.at 897).
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laws that already restrict the property’s potential highest and best use.”43 In
other words, in determining the before-easement highest and best use, all
existing federal, state, and local restrictions on development and use must be
considered.
2.

After-Value

The first step in estimating the after-value of the subject property is
determining the highest and best use of the property as encumbered by the
easement.44 At this stage, the easement’s terms are examined, individually and
collectively, as well as existing zoning regulations and other controls (such as
local historic preservation ordinances) to determine the highest and most
profitable use for which the property would be adaptable and needed or likely
to be needed in the reasonably near future once it is restricted by the
easement.45
The Regulations again incorporate and supplement these general
appraisal principles. The Regulations provide that, if the easement permits any
development, however limited, on the subject property, “the fair market value
of the property after contribution of the [easement] must take into account the
effect of the development.”46 In other words, the appraiser must consider the
reserved development rights in determining the after-easement highest and
best use.
Regulations also provide that an appraisal of the subject property after
contribution of the easement
must take into account the effect of restrictions that will result
in a reduction of the potential fair market value represented
by [the property’s before-easement] highest and best use but
will, nevertheless, permit uses of the property that will
increase its fair market value above that represented by the
property’s current use.47
For example, if the subject property is being used for agricultural purposes,
has a before-easement highest and best use of residential development, and the
easement permits but limits residential development, the appraiser must
consider the limited retained development rights in determining the aftereasement highest and best use.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(ii).
See Hilborn, 85 T.C. at 690.
See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 30 discussing Hughes.
Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(ii).
Id.
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The Regulations further provide that the fair market value of the
subject property after contribution of the easement must take into account the
amount of public access (if any) permitted by the terms of the easement.48 An
easement that permits public access might reduce the after-value of the
property and, thus, increase the value of the easement, but it would depend on
the amount of access permitted.49
C.

Approaches to Estimating Fair Market Value

Once a property’s before-easement highest and best use is determined,
one or more of three commonly recognized methods of valuing property is
generally used to determine the before-value of the property—the sales
comparison approach, the income capitalization approach, and the
reproduction cost approach.50 Similarly, once a property’s after-easement
highest and best use is determined, one or more of those three methods is
generally used to determine the after-value of the property.51 As discussed
below, however, the sales comparison approach is generally considered to
provide the most reliable estimate of value, the income capitalization approach
generally should not be used as the sole or primary method of valuation
because it is particularly susceptible to manipulation and abuse, and the
appropriateness of using the reproduction cost approach to value easements is
questionable.
1.

Sales Comparison Approach

Pursuant to the sales comparison approach, the value of the property
being appraised is estimated by comparing that property to similar properties
that were recently sold in the open market.52 It “is based upon the

48. Id.
49. The rules regarding public access vary depending on the conservation
purpose of the donation. See Reg. §§ 1.170A–14(d)(2)(ii), –14(d)(3)(iii), –
14(d)(4)(ii)(B), –14(d)(4)(iii)(C), –14(d)(5)(iv).
50. See Hilborn, 85 T.C. at 689.
51. Id. at 690.
52. See, e.g., APPRAISAL INST., THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 50 (12th
ed. 2001) [hereinafter AI, APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE]; J.D. EATON, REAL ESTATE
VALUATION IN LITIGATION 197 (1995) [hereinafter EATON, REAL ESTATE
VALUATION]; INTERAGENCY LAND ACQUISITION CONFERENCE, UNIFORM APPRAISAL
STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITIONS 37–38 (2000) [hereinafter ILAC,
YELLOW BOOK].
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commonsense approach of taking the actual sales prices of properties similar
to the subject property and then relating these prices to the subject property.”53
An appraiser using the sales comparison approach to estimate the fair
market value of a subject property (whether before or after the easement
donation) must identify property sales that meet three criteria: (1) the
properties must be similar to the subject property (including have the same
highest and best use); (2) the sales must have been arm’s-length transactions;
and (3) the sales must have occurred within a reasonable time of the valuation
date.54 Because no two sales and no two properties are ever identical, the
appraiser must then consider aspects of the comparable transactions, such as
the size of the property, its location, its topography, and other significant
features, and make appropriate adjustments for each aspect to approximate the
qualities of the subject property.55 The appraiser then uses the sale prices of
the comparable properties, appropriately adjusted, to estimate the value of the
subject property.56
When there is sufficient information about sales of properties similar
to the property being valued, the sales comparison approach is generally
considered to be the most reliable indicator of fair market value.57
Accordingly, in many (if not most) cases, an appraiser estimating the value of
a conservation easement should (a) estimate the before-value of the subject
property by looking to comparable sales of similar unencumbered properties
and (b) estimate the after-value of the subject property by looking to
comparable sales of similar encumbered properties. In estimating the aftervalue of the subject property, appraisers can look to sales of properties
53. Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1, 19 (1979).
54. See, e.g., Butler v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1359, 1368, 2012
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-072, at 527.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. (“We have found the comparable sales approach to be the most
reliable indicator of value when there is sufficient data about sales of properties similar
to the subject property.”); United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 798
(5th Cir. 1979) (“Courts have consistently recognized that, in general, comparable
sales constitute the best evidence of market value”); Esgar I, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at
1198, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-035 at 284 , aff’d 744 F.3d 648; SWF Real Estate v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C.M. (CCH) 1327, 2015 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2015-063, at 469
(“Although the comparable sales method, like all valuation techniques, is far from an
exact science . . . we have found the comparable sales approach to be the most reliable
indicator of value when there is sufficient data about sales of properties similar to the
subject property” (citation omitted)); see also EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION,
supra note 52, at 198 (“The courts appear to prefer the sales comparison approach to
value overwhelmingly”); ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 37 (“federal courts
recognize that the sales comparison approach is normally the best evidence [of
value]”).
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encumbered by similar conservation easements or, if no such sales exist, sales
of properties subject to development and use restrictions or limitations
analogous to those in the conservation easement, such as zoning restrictions or
restricted access.58 Given that the sales comparison approach is generally the
most reliable indicator of value, and the income capitalization and
reproduction cost approaches are subject to manipulation and abuse (as
described below), claims that there are no comparable sales with which to
estimate either the before- or after-value of a property should be carefully
scrutinized.
The sales comparison approach that is applied in determining the
before- and after-values of the subject property in a conservation easement
appraisal should not be confused with the Treasury’s preferred method of
valuing easements discussed above (the “sales of comparable easements”
method). Pursuant to the sales of comparable easements method, the appraiser
would look to sales of easements comparable to the easement being donated,
rather than sales of properties comparable to the subject property before and
after the easement’s donation.
2.

Income Capitalization Approach

The income capitalization approach is sometimes used to estimate the
before- or after-value of property subject to a conservation or façade easement.
In the easement context, this approach generally involves a discounted cash
flow analysis, which is based on the premise that the subject property’s market
value, either before or after the donation, is equal to the present value of the
future income its owners could expect to realize.59 Stated simply, the
property's future cash flows are estimated and those cash flows are then
discounted to present value.60
A discounted cash flow analysis is complex, however, and generally
requires the appraiser to assume a myriad of factors and variables, the accuracy

58. Comparable sales of easement-encumbered properties are available in
some jurisdictions. See, e.g., SWF Real Estate, 109 T.C.M. (CCH) 1327, 2015 T.C.M.
(RIA) ¶ 2015-063, at 469 (each parties’ expert used some sales of properties subject
to conservation easements in estimating the after-easement value of the subject
property); see also S. Rep. No. 96-1007, 1980-2 C.B. 599, at 606 (“[A]s the use of
conservation easement increases, valuation [will] increasingly take into account the
selling price value, in arm’s-length transactions, of other properties burdened with
comparable restrictions.”).
59. Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 321–22.
60. See id. at 322; EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 194.
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of which cannot clearly and easily be demonstrated by direct market data.61
Even relatively minor changes in only a few of the assumptions can have large
bottom-line effects on the value estimate produced.62 In addition, “the seeming
precision of computer-generated projections may give the appearance of
certainty to projections that are actually variable within a wide range.”63
Accordingly, a discounted cash flow analysis is particularly susceptible to
manipulation and abuse and is not favored if comparable-sales data are
available.64
In a case involving valuation for condemnation purposes of a portion
of property used for soil, sand, and gravel extraction, the 8th Circuit explained:
[W]here [the income capitalization method] is used all of the
factors that must necessarily be taken into account should be
established by proper evidence. Where several of the elements
or factors relied on . . . are without objective evidential
support, that method is faulty and can obviously lead to
unfounded and enhanced valuations. . . . Great care must be
taken, or such valuations can reach wonderland proportions.65
The “subdivision development analysis” is a variant of the income
capitalization approach.66 It is a method of appraising undeveloped acreage,
the highest and best use of which is assumed to be subdivision into residential
lots, using a discounted cash flow analysis.67 The approach involves
61. See ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 42.
62. See, e.g., APPRAISAL STANDARDS BD., UNIFORM STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE, STATEMENT ON APPRAISAL STANDARDS NO. 2
(SMT-2) at U-71, U-72 (2014–2015 ed.) (“Because of the compounding effects in the
projection of income and expenses, even slight input errors can be magnified and can
produce unreasonable results.”) [hereinafter USPAP SMT-2].
63. Id. at U-71 (discounted cash flow analysis “did not enjoy widespread
use until modern computer technology enabled appraisers to automate the process”).
64. Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 324 (stating that “we are not hostile to the
income approach to determining value” but “it is not favored if comparable-sales data
are available”); ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 42 (noting “the courts’
obvious preference for the sales comparison approach and that ‘[h]istorically, the
capitalization of income approach to value has been suspect’”); USPAP SMT-2, supra
note 62, at U-71 (providing that discounted cash flow analysis is vulnerable to misuse
because it is dependent on the analysis of uncertain future events).
65. United States v. 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1982)
(“Many of [the] factors are impossible to predict with reasonable accuracy.”).
66. See EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 245; ILAC,
YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 44; AI, APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 52,
at 342–43.
67. ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 44.
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estimating a final sale price for the total number of lots into which the property
could be divided and then deducting all costs of development, including the
developer’s anticipated profit.68
The subdivision development analysis is a “highly sensitive and
complex method of valuation” that involves numerous steps, namely: (i) the
creation of a detailed development plan for the property, including streets,
utilities, lot sizes and locations; (ii) a market study to locate comparable
finished lots and selling prices; (iii) an estimate of the time lag between the
effective date of the appraisal and the date when the subdivision would be
approved and construction of the infrastructure completed, making the lots
marketable; (iv) an absorption analysis to estimate how quickly the lots could
be sold; (v) an analysis of the direct costs of development, including the costs
of surveying, design, engineering, permitting, grading, clearing, sewers, street
paving, curbs and gutters, water lines and other utilities; (vi) an analysis of
indirect costs, including financing, insurance, real property taxes, sales,
advertising, accounting, legal and closing costs, and project overhead and
supervision; (vii) an estimate of developer’s expected profit; and (viii) the
determination of an appropriate discount rate.69 In addition, all of the income
and expenses have to be scheduled over an assumed period of permitting,
development, and sellout so that the income stream can be discounted back to
present value.70
The subdivision development analysis, like discounted cash flow
analyses generally, is particularly susceptible to manipulation and abuse and
is not favored if comparable-sales data are available. The Uniform Appraisal
Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions states that, “[w]hen comparable sales
are available with which to accurately estimate the property’s market value,
the [subdivision development analysis] should not be relied upon as the
primary indicator of value, as it is considerably more prone to error.”71 The
Appraisal of Real Estate similarly cautions “[w]hen used on its own without
an abundance of reliable market data, [the subdivision development analysis]
can be the least accurate raw land valuation technique.”72 And the author of a
treatise on valuation in the eminent domain context cautions:

68. Id. at 44.
69. Id. at 45.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. AI, APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE , supra note 52, at 342–43; see also
EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 247 (“If comparable sales are
available, they should be used in evaluation the property . . . Bona fide sales data
provide a better indication of value than a subdivision development prospectus.”).
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[I]n many cases the [subdivision development analysis] has
been applied under the wrong circumstances or in the wrong
way. If all of the land that has been appraised by the
development approach were actually subdivided, there would
be enough subdivision lots on the market to last hundreds of
years and little, if any, farmland left in the United States.73
Because of the highly speculative nature of the subdivision
development analysis, established appraisal rules dictate that the analysis
should be used as the sole or primary appraisal method only in relatively rare
circumstances. In general, three conditions should be present before the
subdivision development analysis is used to establish the value of land: (1) the
highest and best use of the land must be for subdivision purposes, (2) the sales
comparison approach must not be available because comparable sales either
do not exist or are so few and dissimilar to the subject property that a sales
comparison approach would involve unacceptably speculative adjustments
and assumptions, and (3) sufficient market and technical data are available to
estimate the value of the property reliably using the subdivision development
analysis.74 If comparable sales are available, the subdivision development
analysis should be used only to support the value indicated by the sales
comparison approach, and only then if additional support is needed.75
3.

Reproduction Cost Approach

Pursuant to the reproduction (or replacement) cost approach, a
property is valued by estimating the current costs to reproduce or replace it,
less applicable depreciation or amortization.76 In the easement context, this
approach generally would be relevant only with regard to the valuation of
73. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 246.
74. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 246; ILAC,
YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 19 (“When the highest and best use of a property is
for subdivision purposes and comparable sales do not exist, the appraiser may resort
to the [subdivision development analysis] . . . but only if adequate market and/or
technical data are available with which to reliably estimate the property value by this
approach.”).
75. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 247; ILAC,
YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 45 (“when adequate comparable sales are available,
the [subdivision development analysis] can be utilized to test . . . the highest and best
use conclusion and to support the indicated value of the property by the sales
comparison approach to value.”) (emphasis in original); USPAP SMT-2, supra note
62, at U-71 (the discounted cash flow analysis “is best applied in developing value
opinions in the context of one or more other approaches”).
76. See EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 157–61;
ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 40–42.

242

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 19:4

historic structures. However, its appropriateness even in that context is
questionable. Powell on Real Property explains:
The [reproduction] cost approach to valuation encounters
substantial difficulties when applied to historic structures
(virtually its only application in the conservation easement
context). The reproduction cost of an historic building usually
bears little relationship to its present economic value. Such
cost is usually far in excess of the cost of construction of a
similarly sized modern structure, and may reflect the price of
materials and workmanship that are no longer readily
available.77
The reproduction cost approach appears in the valuation case law only
twice, and in both instances the courts rejected its use. In Losch, the IRS’s
valuation expert at trial used the reproduction cost approach (as well as the
sales comparison and income capitalization approaches) to value a façade
easement donated with respect to an office building in a historic district in
Washington, D.C. In rejecting the use of the reproduction cost approach, the
Tax Court explained:
[I]n dealing with an older, historic structure, it is highly
questionable whether the replacement cost method can be
used to provide meaningful results. It is extremely doubtful
that a building such as 1716 New Hampshire Avenue could
be constructed today. Even if it could, the construction
methods and materials used would likely differ substantially
from those utilized in 1910.78
In Whitehouse v. Commissioner, the taxpayer’s valuation expert used
the reproduction cost approach (as well as the sales comparison and income
capitalization approaches) to value a façade easement donated with respect to
a historic building in New Orleans. The Tax Court, affirmed by the 5th Circuit,
77. RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, VALUATION AND
APPRAISAL METHODS VARY FOR CONSERVATION EASEMENTS § 34A.06, at 34A–54
(Michael Allen Wolf ed. 2015) (“[T]his method of valuation has substantial
disadvantages in the best of circumstances. Its utility has been questioned and it should
be used with care, if it is used at all, in connection with the appraisal of structures
subject to conservation easements.”).
78. Losch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 88,230,
at 1150 (1988).
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rejected the use of the reproduction cost approach because it was based on
unsupported assumptions and the taxpayer was unable to show that it would
be a reasonable business venture to reproduce the 100-year-old building if it
were destroyed.79 The Tax Court also noted that the Court of Appeals has
observed that the reproduction cost approach “‘almost invariably tends to
inflate valuation.”80 This latter sentiment is consistent with appraisal
resources, which provide, for example:
A reading of pertinent cases indicates that the courts’ lack of
confidence in the [reproduction] cost approach is caused not
because of some weakness in the approach itself, but by
flagrant misuse of the approach by appraisers. Some errors
may result from a lack of knowledge, but more often
practitioners use the [reproduction] cost approach to
intentionally exaggerate the market value of property to
benefit their client’s interests.81
D.

When Rezoning Is Assumed

In determining the before-easement highest and best use of the subject
property, conservation easement donors (or, more accurately, their appraisers)
often assert that the property could be rezoned (or upzoned) to allow for more
development than is permitted under existing law. This can dramatically
increase the estimated before-value of the property. The author of a treatise on
valuation in the eminent domain context cautions that “the probability of
rezoning is fertile ground for the unscrupulous, the naïve, and the dreamer . . .
[and] . . . few appraisers adequately support their conclusion on this matter in
their appraisal reports.”82 Accordingly, assertions of a “reasonable
79. Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 321; see also ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra
note 52, at 20 (“The cost approach may be excluded . . . when it is clear that the
improvements would never be reproduced or replaced and application of the cost
approach would contribute nothing to the solution of the appraisal problem.”).
80. Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 317.
81. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 159; see also
ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 20 (“the cost approach is often the least
reliable approach to value and is often maligned by the courts”); United States v.
49,375 Square Feet of Land in Borough of Manhattan, 92 F. Supp. 384, 387–88
(S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff’d United States v. Thisman Realty & Const. Co., 193 F.2d 180
(1952) (“This ‘method’ is perhaps the most excellent example conceivable to
demonstrate that none of such abstractions ought to have a place in the search for
market value.”).
82. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 143. As to why
eminent domain valuation principles are relevant in the conservation easement
valuation context, see Stanley Works, 87 T.C. at 401 n.8 (“The principles and legal
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probability” of rezoning in the “reasonably near future” call for particularly
careful scrutiny.
Moreover, even if it is determined that rezoning of the subject property
is reasonably probable, under no circumstances should the property be valued
as if it were already rezoned.83 The risk of being denied rezoning, or that an
exaction or other condition may be placed on the rezoning, always exists and
must be taken into account.84 The time delay and costs associated with the
rezoning process must also be considered.85 A willing buyer considering
purchase of the property in its current (not yet rezoned) state would take into
account each of these factors.86
Finding true comparable sales in the reasonable-probability-ofrezoning context is also difficult.87 Developers interested in purchasing
property for development usually condition their purchases on procurement of
the necessary rezoning approvals. If the approvals are not obtained, the sale
does not take place.88 Accordingly, sales of properties that have sold for
development generally do not represent the price at which the property would
precedents governing the determination of fair market value of property in tax cases
are the same as those that control the valuation of property in condemnation cases.”);
Esgar II, 744 F.3d at 648 (finding “no material difference between conservation
easement valuation and just compensation valuation in the context of determining a
property's highest and best use”). Cf. Drey v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.
1983) (holding that taxpayers who made a charitable gift of land were not entitled to
a deduction for severance damages to adjacent lands, as would be applicable in the
eminent domain context, because the measure of compensation for property donated
as a charitable contribution is statutory and does not involve the same substantial rights
protected by the fifth amendment of the Constitution as in condemnation cases). The
concept of severance damages is addressed in the easement donation context in Reg.
§ 1.170A–14(h)(3)(i). See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the
contiguous parcel rule and shadow effect).
83. ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 83.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12C.03[2] nn.27, 33 and
accompanying text (even where it is determined there is a reasonable probability of
rezoning, there normally should be a discount because of the uncertainty and
consideration of the practical costs and other burdens involved in obtaining the
rezoning).
87. ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 88, 93 (discussing comparable
sales “requiring extraordinary verification and treatment”).
88. Id. at 92; see also EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at
134 (“Typically, the sale of a developable tract of land is closed only after the
purchaser has procured all necessary permits for development. Thus, the purchaser
incurs no risk as to whether development permits will be available.”).
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have sold if the purchaser had to procure rezoning after the date of closing.89
Instead, such sales represent the price of a property with the rezoning approval
already in place.90 Although appraisers must often resort to using such sales
as comparables, it is essential that they make appropriate adjustments to
account for the risks, time delays, and costs inherent in the rezoning
procurement process.91
E.

Contiguous Parcel, Enhancement, and Incidental Benefit Rules

The Regulations contain a number of rules that require an easement
donor’s charitable income tax deduction to be reduced by any benefits that
inure directly or indirectly to the donor as a result of the donation. If the donor
or a member of the donor’s family owns land contiguous to the land
encumbered by the easement, the Regulations provide that the value of the
easement is equal to the difference between the before- and after-values of the
entire contiguous parcel (the “contiguous parcel rule”).92 If the donation has
the effect of increasing the value of any other property owned by the donor or
a related person, the amount of the deduction must be reduced by the amount
of the increase in the value of the other property, whether or not such property
is contiguous (the “enhancement rule”).93
In the typical case, the contiguous parcel rule operates to decrease the
value of an easement by requiring the donor to take into account the increase
in the value of contiguous property owned by the donor or a member of the
donor’s family as a result of the easement donation (buyers often will pay more
for property that is contiguous to property protected for its conservation or
historic values). In Whitehouse v. Commissioner, however, the donor argued,
and the 5th Circuit agreed, that the rule operated to increase the value of a
façade easement by allowing the donor to take into account the extent to which
the easement decreased the value of a contiguous building also owned by the

89. ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 92.
90. Id. at 92–93.
91. Id. at 93 (in certain circumstances a purchaser may also require an
entrepreneurial profit).
92. Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(i). “Family” is defined as brothers and sisters
by the whole or half blood, spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants. See I.R.C. §
267(c)(4).
93. Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(i). “Related person” is defined to include
various familial, entity, and trust relationships. See I.R.C. §§ 267(b), 707(b); see also
C.C.A.201334039 (Aug. 23, 2012) (addressing the contiguous parcel and
enhancement rules).
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donor.94 This can be referred to as a “shadow effect.”95 The enhancement rule,
on the other hand, operates as a one-way street. It specifically requires that the
donor reduce the amount of the deduction to the extent the easement increases
(or enhances) the value of any other property owned by the donor or a related
person.
The Regulations also require that a donor’s deduction be reduced by
an amount equal to the value of any “financial or economic benefits . . . greater
than those that will inure to the general public from the transfer” that the donor
or a related person receives or can reasonably expect to receive as a result of
the donation.96 As one example, this rule should prevent a developer from
claiming a charitable income tax deduction with respect to a conservation
easement that is conveyed in exchange for permits or other development
approvals or variances (quid pro quo).97
F.

Zero-Value Easements

The Regulations instruct that “there may be instances where the grant
of a conservation restriction may have no material effect on the value of the
property or may in fact serve to enhance, rather than reduce, the value of
property[.]”98 “In such instances,” state the regulations, “no deduction would
be allowable.”99 As discussed in Parts IV and V, there have been numerous
cases in which the courts have determined that façade easements had no value,
and one case in which the court determined that a conservation easement had
no value.

2014).

94. See Whitehouse Hotel v. Commissioner, 755 F.3d 236, 242–43 (5th Cir.

95. See James H. Boykin & James A. McLaughlin, Addressing
Enhancement in Conservation Easement Appraisals, 74 APPRAISAL J. 239, 245
(2006); see also supra note 82 (discussing severance damage in the eminent domain
context).
96. Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(i). See also Reg. § 1.170-1(h)(1); U.S. v. Am.
Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986).
97. For cases disallowing § 170(h) deductions because the easements were
conveyed in exchange for quid pro quo, see Costello v. Commissioner, 109 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1441, 2015 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2015-087, at 631; Seventeen Seventy Sherman
Street v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1599, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2014-124, at
863; Pollard v. Commissioner, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013038, at 351; see also Stephen J. Small, Real Estate Developers and Conservation
Easements—Not as Simple as it Sounds, 19 PROB. & PROP. 24 (2005).
98. Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(ii).
99. Id.
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OVERVALUATION PENALTIES

Taxpayers that overstate the value of their easements and the
appraisers who assist them are potentially subject to penalties.
A.

Taxpayer Penalties

Taxpayers may be subject to penalties if they substantially or grossly
overstate the value of an easement for purposes of the § 170(h) deduction.100
Before the enactment of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), taxpayers
were subject to a 20 percent penalty if the value of an easement reported on a
tax return was two times (200 percent) or more of the amount determined to
be the correct value (a “substantial valuation misstatement”).101 Taxpayers
were subject to a 40 percent penalty if the value reported on a tax return was
four times (400 percent) or more of the amount determined to be the correct
value (a “gross valuation misstatement”).102 The PPA lowered the thresholds
to 150 percent for a substantial valuation misstatement and to 200 percent for
a gross valuation misstatement.103 In addition, if the correct value of an
easement is determined to be zero, the value claimed by the taxpayer on the
return is deemed to be 400 percent or more of the correct value and, thus, a
gross valuation misstatement.104
For example, as indicated in Appendix A, in Zarlengo v.
Commissioner the taxpayers reported that the donated façade easement at issue
had a value of $660,000, but the Tax Court determined that the correct value
was only $157,500. The taxpayers thus reported a value for the easement on
their tax returns that was more than four times (or 419 percent) of the amount
the court determined to be the correct value.105 Accordingly, the taxpayers’
reported value constituted a gross valuation misstatement under both pre- and
post-PPA law. In addition, in Dunlap v. Commissioner, Kaufman v.
Commissioner, Foster v. Commissioner, Evans v. Commissioner, Scheidelman
v. Commissioner, Reisner v. Commissioner, and Chandler v. Commissioner,
the courts determined that the façade easements at issue had no value.106
100. See I.R.C. § 6662 (also authorizing the imposition of penalties for
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations and substantial understatements of
income tax).
101. See Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman I), 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1262,
2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2014-052 at 387, aff’d Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman II),
784 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2015).
102. Id.
103. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF PPA, supra note 11, at 275–77.
104. See Reg. § 1.6662–5(g).
105. See infra app. A.
106. See id.
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Accordingly, the values claimed by the taxpayers on their returns were deemed
to be 400 percent or more of the correct value and, thus, gross valuation
misstatements.
In some circumstances, penalties may not apply if a taxpayer qualifies
for the reasonable cause exception.107 However, the requirements of the
reasonable cause exception vary with regard to the individual penalties.108 In
addition, the PPA eliminated the reasonable cause exception for gross
valuation misstatements, making that penalty a strict liability penalty with
regard to returns filed after certain dates in 2006.109
B.

Appraiser Penalties

Appraisers preparing conservation or façade easement appraisals are
also potentially subject to a number of penalties. An appraiser who knowingly
facilitates (aids and abets) an easement donor’s understatement of tax liability
may be subject to a penalty of $1,000.110 An appraiser who prepares an
appraisal that results in a substantial or gross valuation misstatement may be
subject to a penalty equal to, at most, 125 percent of the gross income derived

107. I.R.C. § 6664(c).
108. Penalties for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations or a
substantial understatement of income tax will not apply (that is, the reasonable cause
exception will apply) if the taxpayer can show there was reasonable cause for the
understatement and the taxpayer acted in good faith. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1). The penalty
for a substantial valuation misstatement in the case of charitable deduction property
will not apply if the taxpayer can show that (i) the misstatement was made with
reasonable cause and in good faith, (ii) the misstatement was based on a qualified
appraisal prepared by a qualified appraiser, and (iii) the taxpayer made a good-faith
investigation of the value of the easement. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1), (3), (4). Before the
changes made by the PPA, the reasonable cause exception with regard to the gross
valuation misstatement penalty required the same showing as in the preceding
sentence.
109. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF PPA, supra note 11, at 311. The strict
liability penalty applies to returns claiming deductions for façade easement donations
filed after July 25, 2006, and to returns claiming deductions for conservation easement
donations filed after August 17, 2006. See Chandler v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 279,
293, n.5 (2014).
110. I.R.C. § 6701(b)(1). If the easement donor is a corporation, the penalty
is $10,000. I.R.C. § 6701(b)(2).
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from the appraisal.111 This latter penalty does not apply if the appraiser can
establish that it was “more likely than not” that the appraisal was correct.112
In addition, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, the Secretary
of the Treasury may “blacklist” an appraiser (that is, provide that the
appraiser’s appraisals will have no probative effect in any administrative
proceeding before the Treasury or the IRS and bar such appraiser from
presenting evidence or testimony in any such proceeding).113 Furthermore, the
United States may enjoin any person from engaging in “specified conduct,”
including knowingly aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liability.114
IV.

FAÇADE EASEMENT VALUATION CASE LAW

The seventeen cases involving the valuation of façade easements for
charitable contribution deduction purposes through 2015 are listed in
Appendix A. These cases can be usefully divided into two categories: (i) the
six cases involving façade easements donated between 1979 and 1981 (the
early cases) and (ii) the eleven cases involving façade easements donated in
1997 and thereafter (the recent cases). An analysis of these cases, particularly
the recent cases, reveals some interesting trends.
A.

Persistent and Increased Overstatements

As indicated in Appendix A, in the six early cases involving donations
of façade easements, the average amount by which the taxpayers overstated
the value of the easements was $102,100, and, on average, the taxpayers
asserted values for their easements that were slightly more than two times (or
206 percent of) the court-determined values. In the eleven recent cases, the
average amount by which the taxpayers overstated the value of the easements
increased to more than $1.4 million,115 and, on average, the taxpayers asserted
values for the easements that were more than four times (or 406 percent of)
111. I.R.C. §6695A(b). The penalty is equal to the greater of $1,000 or 10
percent of the understatement of tax resulting from the substantial or gross valuation
misstatement, up to a maximum of 125 percent of the gross income derived from the
appraisal.
112. I.R.C. § 6695A(c).
113. See 31 U.S.C. § 330(c) (2015); see also 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) (2015)
(authorizing the Secretary to suspend or disbar from practice before the Treasury a
representative who, among other things, is incompetent, disreputable, or violates
regulations).
114. See I.R.C. § 7408.
115. Some of the increase in the dollar value of the overstatements is
attributable to appreciation in the value of real estate since the late 1970s and early
1980s.
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the court-determined values. In all but one of the recent cases, the taxpayers’
asserted values for the easements constituted gross valuation misstatements.116
Some of the individual overstatements in the recent cases in terms of
dollar value were substantial: more than $500,000 in two of the cases, more
than $5.5 million in one case, and more than $8.1 million in another.
Moreover, in seven of the eleven recent cases, the taxpayers claimed sizable
deductions (from $98,500 to $8.1 million) for easements that were determined
to have no value.
The case law reflected in Appendix A suggests that overvaluation has
been a persistent problem in the facade easement donation context. In addition,
the fact that the taxpayers in the recent cases asserted values for their
easements that were, on average, more than four times the court-determined
values, and in seven of the cases claimed sizable deductions for easements that
were determined to have no value, suggests that the problem of overstatements
has worsened over time. It also is likely that the IRS has become more skilled
at ferreting out and litigating abuses.
B.

Commercial versus Residential Properties

The existing case law also indicates that façade easements tend to have
a more significant negative impact on the value of commercial properties than
on residential properties. As indicated in Appendix B, all six of the early cases
involved façade easements donated with respect to commercial properties,
while ten of the eleven recent cases involved façade easements donated with
respect to residential properties. Dunlap v. Commissioner involved a
residential property—a condominium in New York City—in which the owners
of units donated a façade easement with regard to the building and claimed a
share of the deduction based on the value of their units. Whitehouse v.
Commissioner is the only recent case that involved the donation of a façade
easement with respect to a commercial property.
As indicated in Appendix B, in Whitehouse v. Commissioner, the Tax
Court, affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, found that a façade easement reduced the
value of a historic building in New Orleans, which is now used as a hotel, by
approximately $1.85 million, or by 14.9 percent. This is consistent with the six
early cases involving commercial properties in which the courts found that the
façade easements reduced the value of the properties, on average, by 18.9
percent. In contrast, in the ten recent cases involving façade easements donated
with respect to residential properties, seven of the easements were found to
116. The taxpayer’s asserted values for the easements in Simmons v.
Commissioner constituted substantial valuation misstatements at the time the returns
were filed but would have constituted gross valuation misstatements had the returns
been filed after the PPA changes were effective.
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have no value, and three were found to have reduced the value of the
residences by only a modest percentage (2 percent in Gorra v. Commissioner,
3.5 percent in Zarlengo v. Commissioner, and 5 percent in Simmons v.
Commissioner).
In Chandler v. Commissioner, which involved façade easements
donated with respect to two residential properties, the court offered an
explanation as to why façade easements tend to have a more significant
negative impact on the value of commercial as opposed to residential
properties.
Restrictions on construction impair the value of commercial
property more tangibly than they impair the value of
residential property. Commercial property derives its value
from its ability to generate cashflows. For commercial
property, development generally correlates with increased
future cashflows. More retail space, more space for tenants,
and more room for customers generally increase profitability.
Restrictions on the development of commercial property
reduce potential for increased future cashflows and thus
diminish value.
Construction restrictions affect residential property values
more subtly. People do not buy homes primarily to make
money, and personal rather than business reasons usually
motivate any construction on their homes. The loss of
freedom to make changes to the exterior of one’s home has a
price, but it is difficult to quantify. The task becomes even
more difficult when we consider the already existing [local
historic preservation] restrictions on the property. Even if [the
taxpayers in Chandler] had not granted the easements, local
law would have prevented them from freely altering their
homes. The easements had value only to the extent their
unique restrictions diminished [the taxpayers’] property
values.117
In Chandler the Tax Court ultimately concluded that the façade easements
donated with respect to the residential properties had no value.118

117. Chandler, 142 T.C. at 289.
118. Id. at 290.

252

C.

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 19:4

Residential Properties Subject to Local Historic Preservation Laws

The recent cases analyzed in Appendix B suggest that façade
easements donated with respect to residential properties that are already
subject to local historic preservation laws either have no negative impact on
the value of such properties or reduce the value of such properties by only a
modest percentage. The results in the cases are, however, somewhat
unpredictable. In some cases courts have found that the additional restrictions
in an easement have no negative impact on value, while in other (very similar)
cases the courts find that the additional restrictions have a modest negative
impact on value. In addition, facts specific to a particular case, such as the
credibility (or lack thereof) of the parties’ valuation experts, can influence the
holdings.
As indicated in Appendix B, in the ten recent cases involving façade
easements donated with respect to residential properties, all of which were
subject to local historic preservation laws, seven of the easements were found
to have no value, while three were found to have reduced the value of the
residences by 5 percent or less. In two of the seven zero-value cases, Foster v.
Commissioner and Evans v. Commissioner, the taxpayers failed to provide
sufficient credible evidence that the easements had any value.119 In one of the
seven zero-value cases, Reisner v. Commissioner, the parties stipulated at trial
that the easement had no value.120 In the remaining four of the seven zerovalue cases, Dunlap v. Commissioner, Kaufman v. Commissioner,
Scheidelman v. Commissioner, and Chandler, the courts compared the
restrictions imposed by the easements and the restrictions imposed by local
law and determined that, despite some differences, the easements did not
negatively impact the fair market value of the residences.121 In contrast, in
Simmons v. Commissioner, Zarlengo v. Commissioner, and Gorra v.
Commissioner, the courts compared the restrictions imposed by the easements

119. See Evans v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 275, 279, 2010 T.C.M.
(RIA) ¶ 2010-207, at 1276 (2010) (declining to give the reports of the taxpayer’s
expert any probative weight in part because of “the various conceptual,
methodological, and calculation errors that she acknowledged”); Foster v.
Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-90, 2012 WL 3964754, at *4–5 (taxpayer’s
expert improperly relied on what he apparently considered to be a “safe harbor”
diminution percentage to determine the value of the easement).
120. Reisner v. Commissioner, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 518, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA)
2014-230, at 1663.
121. See Kaufman II, 784 F.3d 56; Scheidelman, 755 F.3d 148; Chandler,
142 T.C. at 279; Dunlap v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1689, 2012 T.C.M.
(RIA) ¶ 2012-126, at 987.
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and the restrictions imposed by local law and determined that the differences,
although modest, did negatively impact the value of the residences.122
A comparison of the holdings in Chandler, Scheidelman, and
Zarlengo provides some sense of the unpredictability of the decisions in this
context. Chandler involved the donation of façade easements with respect to
two residences located in the South End Historic District of Boston,
Massachusetts.123 Both residences were subject to local historic preservation
laws enforced by the South End Landmark District Commission (LDC).124
The Tax Court determined that there were several differences between the
easement restrictions and the local historic preservation laws. In particular, the
restrictions in the easements were broader in scope than those under local law
and the easement holder, the National Architectural Trust (NAT), more
actively enforced its easements than the LDC enforced local law.125
Despite these differences, the Tax Court in Chandler found that the
easements did not negatively impact the value of the residences.126 In addition
to finding the report of the taxpayer’s valuation expert not to be credible, the
court agreed with the IRS’s valuation expert that “a typical buyer would
perceive no difference between the two sets of applicable restrictions[.]”127
In Scheidelman, the Second Circuit similarly held that the donation of
a façade easement to NAT with respect to a residence located in Brooklyn’s
Fort Greene Historic District had no negative impact on the value of the
residence.128 The Second Circuit agreed with the Tax Court that the easement
122. Simmons v. Commissioner, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Zarlengo v.
Commissioner, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 155, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2014-161, at 1135;
Gorra v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013-254, at
2059.
123. Chandler, 142 T.C. at 280.
124. Id. at 282.
125. Id. at 290.
126. Id.
127. Id. The Tax Court in Chandler relied on its earlier holding in Kaufman,
in which the court performed the same analysis under identical circumstances and
determined that the easement had no value (Kaufman also involved a façade easement
donated to NAT with respect to a residence in the South End Historic District). Id. In
Kaufman, after engaging in a detailed analysis of the two sets of restrictions, the Tax
Court explained that the IRS’s expert “convinced us that the restrictive components of
the preservation agreement are basically duplicative of, and not materially different
from, the South End Standards and Criteria.” Kaufman I, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1262,
2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2014-052, at 387.
128. Scheidelman, 755 F.3d at 153–54; see also Dunlap, 103 T.C.M. (CCH)
1689, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-126, at 987 (façade easement donated with respect
to the Cobblestone Loft Condominium in New York City’s Tribeca North Historic
District had no value; the building was subject to the New York City Landmark
Preservation Commission’s (LPC’s) special “sound, first-class condition” designation
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“was not appreciably more restrictive” than local historic preservation laws.129
While the Second Circuit acknowledged that “[o]rdinarily any encumbrance
on real property, howsoever slight, would tend to have some negative effect
on that property’s fair market value,” it explained that neither the Tax Court
nor any Circuit Court has held that the grant of an easement effects a per se
reduction in the fair market value of the subject property.130 “To the contrary,”
said the Second Circuit, “the regulations provide that an easement that has no
material effect on the obligations of the property owner or the uses to which
the property may be put ‘may have no material effect on the value of the
property.’”131
Quoting the Regulations, the Second Circuit further explained that
sometimes an easement “may in fact serve to enhance, rather than reduce, the
value of property.”132 The Second Circuit concluded that, based on the
evidence in Scheidelman, the Tax Court “drew the fair inference” that the
preservation of historic façades in the Fort Greene Historic District is a benefit
rather than a detriment to the value of the subject properties.133
However, the Tax Court came to a different conclusion in Zarlengo.
Zarlengo also involved the donation of a façade easement to NAT, but this
time with respect to a residence in the Riverside Historic District of New York
City.134 The residence was subject to local historic preservation laws enforced
and the court did not believe the restrictions imposed by or the holder’s enforcement
of the easement were any more stringent than the restrictions imposed by or the LPC’s
enforcement of local laws).
129. Scheidelman, 755 F.3d at 153.
130. Id. at 152.
131. Id. The Court also cited to the Vice President & General Counsel of the
National Trust for Historic Preservation, who, in a hearing before a Congress, stated,
“This is ‘especially’ true if only a ‘simple façade easement’ has been granted over a
property ‘that ha[s] substantial market value because of [its] historic character.’” Id.
132. Id (quoting Regulation § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii)).
133. Id. at 152; see also Richmond v. Commissioner, 699 F.Supp. 578, 582–
83 (E.D. La. 1988) (“It is by no means axiomatic that the value of property encumbered
by a facade easement automatically declines as a result of the easement”; the donation
of a facade easement “may, in fact, enhance the value of the property.”); S. Rep. No.
96-1007, 1980-2 C.B. 599, at 606 (stating that “there may be instances in which the
grant of an easement may serve to enhance, rather than reduce, the value of property
and in such instances no deduction would be allowable; for example, where there is a
premium in value on property of a historic nature”).
134. Zarlengo, 108 TCM (CCH) 155, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2014-161, at
1138. As indicated in Appendix B, NAT (now known as the Trust for Architectural
Easements) was the donee in seven of the ten cases involving façade easements
donations with respect to residences. In June 2011, the Department of Justice filed a
lawsuit against NAT alleging that it was engaged in abusive practices. See Complaint
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by New York City’s Landmark Preservation Commission (LPC).135 As in
Chandler, the Tax Court determined that there were several differences
between the easement restrictions and local law. In particular, the restrictions
in the easement were somewhat more restrictive than those under local law
and NAT more actively enforced its easements than the LPC enforced local
law.136
Based on these facts, and in contrast to its conclusions in Chandler
and Scheidelman, the Tax Court found that the easement in Zarlengo provided
the residence “with an additional layer of protection over and above that
provided by the LPC’s regulations.”137 The court also found the assertion of
the IRS’s valuation expert that the easement did not place additional burdens
on the owner of the residence to be “conclusory” and based on the expert’s
“preconceived notion that conservation easements have no value.”138 The
court rejected the IRS expert’s analysis as unsupported and unreliable, noting
that “any encumbrance on real property, however slight, would ordinarily tend
to have some negative effect on a property’s fair market value.”139
The Tax Court in Zarlengo ultimately concluded that 3.5 percent was
a reasonable diminution in the value of the residence as a result of the

for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, United States v. McClain, Civ. No. 111087 (D.C. June 14, 2011). In July 2011, the court issued a permanent injunction
against NAT settling the case. See Stipulated Order of Permanent Injunction, United
States v. McClain, Civ. No. 11-1087 (D.C. July, 15, 2011). The injunction
permanently prohibits NAT from engaging in certain practices, such as representing
that the IRS has established a safe harbor for the value of donated façade easements,
participating in the appraisal process, and requesting cash donations tied to the
estimated value of the easement. Id. NAT was ordered to pay an independent monitor
for two years to ensure it complied with the injunction. Id.
135. Zarlengo, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 155, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2014-161, at
1138.
136. Id. at 1138, 1140, 1146 n.11.
137. Id. at 1140, 1146 n.11.
138. Id. at 1143–44.
139. Id. at 1153 (citation omitted); see Dunlap, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1689,
2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-126, at 1007 (accord); see also Simmons v. Commissioner,
98 T.C.M. (CCH) 211, 217, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-208, at 1570, aff’d, 646 F.3d
6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“We do not find [the IRS’s] expert reports credible insofar as they
maintain that an easement would have absolutely no effect on the fair market value of
valuable real estate.”); Gorra, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013254, at 2069 (same). In Dunlap, Kaufman, Scheidelman, and Chandler, however, the
courts agreed with the IRS that the façade easements had no effect on the fair market
value of the residences. See Dunlap, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1689, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2012-126; Kaufman II, 784 F.3d 56; Scheidelman, 755 F.3d 148; Chandler, 142 T.C.
279.
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additional burdens imposed by the easement.140 The court explained that
“‘[v]aluation is . . . necessarily an approximation[,]’ and ‘[i]t is not necessary
that the value arrived at by the trial court be a figure as to which there is
specific testimony, if it is within the range of figures that may properly be
deduced from the evidence.’”141 In settling on 3.5 percent as a reasonable
diminution percentage, the court noted that it had found 2 percent to be
reasonable in Gorra v. Commissioner and 5 percent to be reasonable in
Simmons v. Commissioner.142
Chandler, Scheidelman, and Zarlengo illustrate that, despite similar
facts, courts can come to different conclusions regarding whether a façade
easement reduces the value of a residence that is already subject to local
historic preservation laws. The cases also illustrate the type of analysis of the
two sets of restrictions that is required to assess whether a façade easement has
an effect on market value, as well as some of the additional factors that a court
may find persuasive, such as the credibility of a party’s valuation expert.
D.

Whitehouse v. Commissioner—Tripartite Abuse

Whitehouse illustrates that all three approaches to valuation can be
used to overstate the value of a facade easement. In Whitehouse, a partnership
claimed a deduction of more than $7.4 million for the donation of a façade
easement with respect to the Maison Blanche building in the French Quarter
of New Orleans, which the partnership planned to rehabilitate for use as a RitzCarlton hotel.143 The IRS challenged the claimed deduction, and the Tax Court,
affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, concluded that the easement had a value of only
approximately $1.85 million.144 The value the partnership reported for the
easement on its tax return was thus slightly more than four times (401 percent

1138.

140. Zarlengo, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 155, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2014-161, at

141. Id.
142. Id.; see Gorra, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 523, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013-254,
at 2059 (holding that a façade easement donated to NAT with respect to a residence
subject to New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law was more restrictive than
local law and resulted in a 2 percent diminution in the residence’s value); Simmons,
646 F.3d at 12 (holding that façade easements donated to L’Enfant Trust with respect
to residences subject to local historic preservation laws were duplicative of those laws
in some respects but nonetheless resulted in a 5 percent diminution in value).
143. See Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 307–10. The building is now used as a
Ritz-Carlton hotel. Id. at 308.
144. Id. at 348.
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of) the amount the court determined to be the correct value, which constituted
a gross valuation misstatement.145
At trial, the partnership offered the report and testimony of a valuation
expert who relied primarily on a reproduction cost approach and an income
capitalization approach, but also, in part, used a sales comparison approach.
The expert estimated that the easement had a value of $10 million, which was
$2.6 million more than partnership had claimed as the value on its tax return,
and more than five times the value the court determined to be the correct
value.146 As discussed below, the Tax Court determined that the partnership’s
expert had inflated the value of the easement by using nonlocal “comparables”
in his sales comparison approach, by using unsupported assumptions in his
income capitalization approach, and by inappropriately employing the
reproduction cost approach.
1.

Nonlocal Comparables

The partnership’s expert was based in Chicago but had obtained a
temporary license from the state of Louisiana for the purpose of preparing the
Whitehouse appraisal.147 He used the sales comparison approach to determine
that the Maison Blanche building and the adjacent Kress building had a
collective before-value of $40 million, or more than three times the $11 million
that the partnership had paid for the buildings just two years before the
easement donation.148 The partnership’s expert included five sales of buildings
in downtown New Orleans (local comparables) in his analysis.149 He also
included seven sales of buildings in various other U.S. cities (nonlocal
comparables) because he claimed that none of the buildings in downtown New
Orleans were similar to the Maison Blanche-Kress buildings “in size, luxury,
or hotel market orientation.” 150 He also noted that “‘[b]uildings purchased for
rehabilitation into first class luxury hotels trade in a national marketplace, so
it is appropriate to analyze sales in other cities for purposes of establishing the
145. Id. at 349. The Fifth Circuit found that the partnership was not liable for
the gross valuation misstatement penalty because it qualified for the reasonable cause
exception. Whitehouse Hotel, 755 F.3d at 249–50.
146. Whitehouse III, 139 T.C.at 311–12.
147. Id. at 310.
148. Id. at 308, 311. The partnership owned both buildings and its hotel
development plan included combining the buildings. Id. at 308.
149. Whitehouse Hotel v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 112, 142–43 (2008),
vacated and remanded by 615 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2010), holding on remand, 139 T.C.
304 (2012), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 755 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2014).
150. Id. at 143, 157 (four of the seven nonlocal comparables were located in
Manhattan, one was in Boston, one was in Washington, D.C., and one was in
Cleveland).
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value of the Maison Blanche Hotel Complex by the Sales Comparison
Approach.’”151
The IRS’s expert at trial was licensed by the state of Louisiana; had
been appraising real estate in the state for over twenty-five years; had
appraised between fifty and seventy buildings in and around New Orleans that
were to be used as or converted into hotels; and had, over the years, appraised
the value of every building within the same square as the Maison Blanche
building, as well as the value of the Maison Blanche building itself on three
prior occasions.152 The IRS’s expert saw no need to use nonlocal
comparables.153 While he agreed that an appraiser occasionally has to look
outside the location of a subject property for comparables because there are
insufficient local sales, he determined that there were adequate local
comparable sales on which to base the before-value of the Maison Blanche
and, indeed, he identified nine.154
The Tax Court rejected the partnership’s expert’s use of nonlocal
comparables for a number of reasons. First, “location plays a huge role in
determining the desirability, and, thus, the value of real estate” and the risk of
error is reduced substantially in employing the sales comparison approach “if,
on account of proximity, we can eliminate (or reduce the significance of)
location as a distinguishing factor.”155 Second, the Fifth Circuit has recognized
the link between proximity and probative value: “The more comparable a sale
is in characteristics, proximity, and time, the more probative it is of value.”156
Third, the risk of relying on the nonlocal comparables in Whitehouse was
substantial because the values the partnership’s expert attributed to the
nonlocal properties were significantly higher than those he attributed to the
local comparables, and those large variances “underscore[d] the lack of
comparability” of the nonlocal properties.157 Fourth, given that the
partnership’s expert had identified five, and the IRS’s expert had identified
nine local comparables, it was unnecessary to rely on the riskier nonlocal
comparables.158 Fifth, the Tax Court was not convinced by the partnership’s
expert’s claim that it was appropriate to take nonlocal sales into account
because buildings purchased for rehabilitation into first class luxury hotels
151. Id. at 157.
152. Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 311.
153. Id. at 329.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner, 267 F.3d 366, 373 (5th
Cir.2001)) (emphasis added by Tax Court).
157. Id. at 329–30.
158. Id. at 330.
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traded in a national marketplace.159 The expert offered no statistics supporting
that claim, nor did he have evidence of any competition in the local or national
market for the Maison Blanche building, which, just two years before the
valuation date, had been purchased for the relatively moderate price of $6.625
million.160
Finally, the partnership’s expert also justified his use of nonlocal
comparables on the ground that buyers in the marketplace for shell buildings
suitable for development into luxury hotels “will pay a premium without trying
to think about what the local buyers will pay.”161 In other words, he testified
that developers of luxury hotels “will leave money on the table by paying more
than the local market would demand for the property.”162 The Tax Court found
that this assertion “defie[d] common sense” and contradicted a basic tenet of
the fair market value paradigm, namely that the hypothetical buyer and the
hypothetical seller are rational economic actors and “each seeks to maximize
his advantage in the context of the market that exists at the date of
valuation.”163
Whitehouse illustrates how the sales comparison approach can be
abused by relying on sales of nonlocal properties. The degree of proximity will
vary with the type of property being appraised and sales activity in the area164
and, in some circumstances, a property may be desirable in the national or
regional market for a special use.165 However, “the best rule of thumb . . . is
that, all else being equal, the best comparables are those located closest to the
property being appraised.”166 Accordingly, any use of nonlocal comparables
should be carefully scrutinized.167

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 336.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 208–09.
165. See Stanley Works, 87 T.C. at 411–12 (before-easement highest and best
use of the subject property, which was located on the Housatonic River in Connecticut,
was as a hydroelectric power pumped storage plant, and the per-acre price paid for
pumped storage land in the New England region produced a “reasonably reliable guide
to the value of the . . . property”).
166. See EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 208–09.
167. Id. at 209 (stating that appraisers should be cautious, and noting that one
condemnor’s attorney has been known to display an eight-foot by ten-foot map of the
United States in closing arguments to point out the location of the opposing party’s
appraiser’s comparables).
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Manipulation of Income Capitalization Approach

The partnership’s valuation expert in Whitehouse also employed the
income capitalization approach to estimate the value of the easement.168 The
Tax Court rejected his use of this approach, finding it to be unreliable.169
In rejecting the expert’s income capitalization approach, the Tax Court
explained that, on the date of the easement’s donation, the partnership and
Ritz-Carlton had entered into agreements pursuant to which the partnership
agreed to renovate the Maison Blanche and Kress buildings and Ritz-Carlton
agreed to operate a hotel therein.170 However, on the date of the donation there
had been no renovation and there was no hotel.171 Rather, all that was valuable
with respect to the Maison Blanche building on the date of donation was its
shell, since the rehabilitation plan called for removing all interior partitions as
well as mechanical and electrical systems.172
The partnership’s expert nonetheless assumed an operating RitzCarlton hotel in his income capitalization analysis.173 He estimated the
rehabilitation costs, operating revenues, operating costs and expenses, and
profits associated with the proposed hotel; he inserted those estimates into a
complex computerized discounted cash flow model; and he came up with
before-value for the Maison Blanche and Kress buildings of $41 million
(which was close to the $40 million before-value he estimated using his flawed
sales comparison approach).174 In rejecting the expert’s income capitalization
analysis, the Tax Court noted that “[t]he seemingly mechanical nature of the
process” should not obscure the fact that the resulting estimate was based on
an analysis of a considerable number of underlying data, many of which were
as yet unknown.175 Some of the risks were obvious, said the court: for
example, the hotel might not be finished on schedule (it was not) and
occupancy might be less than expected.176 Moreover, in estimating
construction costs and hotel receipts and expenses alone, the partnership’s
expert made hundreds of assumptions involving amounts both large (for
example, assumed construction-period interest of $9.9 million) and small (for
example, assumed telephone revenue from each hypothetically occupied hotel
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 311.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 311, 322.
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 323.
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room of $4.50 a night), each carrying with it some risk of error.177 The court
also pointed out that its own calculations demonstrated that even relatively
minor changes in only a few of the assumptions had large bottom-line
effects.178
The Tax Court acknowledged that it had used the income
capitalization approach, in the form of the subdivision development analysis,
to value conservation easements in other cases (for example, Trout Ranch).179
The Tax Court explained, however, that in those instances, it “had sufficient
information from the experts that [it was] comfortable in evaluating and
adjusting their analyses to produce valuations in which [it] had confidence.”180
The Tax Court also emphasized that the income capitalization approach “is not
favored if comparable-sales data are available.”181
The partnership’s expert in Whitehouse also did not capitalize the
income of an ongoing business.182 Rather, he identified the property that he
was to value as the shell of the Maison Blanche building and, for that property,
comparable-sales data were readily available.183 The Tax Court explained that
there was simply too much uncertainty and unquantified risk associated with
the application of the income capitalization approach in Whitehouse for the
court to accept at face value the conclusions resulting from that approach.184
In other words, the readily-available comparable sales of similar properties
were much more reliable indicators of the value of the Maison Blanche shell
than the complex income capitalization approach, which relied on hundreds of
insufficiently supported assumptions to value a completely hypothetical
luxury hotel.
Whitehouse illustrates the complex and manipulable nature of the
income capitalization approach. The sophistication and seeming precision of
such a computer-generated analysis can obscure the fact that it relies on
multiple assumptions, many of which are impossible to predict with
reasonable accuracy.185 If comparable sales are available, as they were in
Whitehouse, the sales comparison approach should be used to estimate value,

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 324.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 325.
183. Id. at 325–26.
184. Id. at 326.
185. See 47.14 Acres of Land, 674 F.2d 722; see also supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
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with the income capitalization approach being used, if at all, only to check the
value indicated by the sales comparison approach.186
3.

Inappropriate Use of Reproduction Cost Approach

The partnership’s expert in Whitehouse also used the “often maligned”
reproduction cost approach to estimate that the Maison Blanche and Kress
buildings had a before-value of $43 million (which was close to the $41 and
$40 million estimates he obtained using his flawed income capitalization and
sales comparison approaches).187 As noted in Part II, the Tax Court rejected
the expert’s use of this approach because it was based on unsupported
assumptions and it was unlikely that the 100-year-old Maison Blanche
building would be reproduced were it destroyed. The court also explained that
a before-value of $43 million “defied reason” given that the partnership had
purchased the properties just two years earlier for only $11 million and the
New Orleans real estate market had enjoyed, at best, stable growth during the
two-year period.188 It appears that the partnership’s expert used this approach
to “intentionally exaggerate the market value of the property to benefit [his]
client’s interests.”189
4.

Lessons from Whitehouse

The Tax Court in Whitehouse ultimately relied on the sales
comparison approach and local comparable sales to conclude that (i) the
before-value of the Maison Blanche and Kress buildings at the time of the
easement donation was only approximately $12.4 million (rather than $40,
$41, or $43 million), (ii) the after-value was approximately $10.6 million, and,
thus, (iii) the easement had a value of approximately $1.85 million.190
Whitehouse illustrates a basic appraisal principle: when there is sufficient
information about sales of properties similar to the property being valued, the
sales comparison approach is the most reliable indicator of fair market value.
Whitehouse also illustrates that experts may employ sophisticated and
seemingly precise models to inflate values and obscure the question to be
answered—namely, at what price would the subject property change hands
between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither being under any compulsion

text.

186. See supra notes 64 and 75 and accompanying text.
187. See Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 311; supra note 81 and accompanying
188. Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 318–19.
189. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
190. Whitehouse III, 139 T.C. at 348.
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to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of any relevant facts? As
noted in the Uniform Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions, “Too
often it has been found in appraisal reports that . . . the most reliable approach
to value [the sales comparison approach] has been overshadowed by the time,
attention, and detail given to other less reliable approaches to value.”191
E.

Penalties

As indicated in Appendix A, in ten of the eleven recent cases involving
the valuation of façade easements, the taxpayers overstated the value of the
easements by 400 percent or more—that is, they made gross valuation
misstatements under both pre- or post-PPA law. In the remaining case,
Simmons v. Commissioner, the taxpayer asserted values for the donated
easements that constituted substantial valuation misstatements under pre-PPA
law (which was in effect when the returns were filed), but would constitute
gross valuation misstatements under post-PPA law (which lowered the
threshold for such misstatements to 200 percent).192
In two of the eleven recent cases, and Simmons and Foster v.
Commissioner, valuation overstatement penalties were not addressed in the
opinion, presumably because the IRS did not assert such penalties. In seven of
the remaining nine recent cases, the taxpayers were able to avoid gross
valuation misstatement penalties by qualifying for the reasonable cause
exception (in three of the cases, Reisner v. Commissioner, Chandler v.
Commissioner, and Zarlengo v. Commissioner, the taxpayers qualified for the
exception with regard to returns they filed before the penalty became a strict
liability penalty). The taxpayers failed to qualify for the reasonable cause
exception in only one case in which the exception was available—Kaufman v.
Commissioner—and Kaufman involved patently abusive behavior (that is, the
Kaufmans had been informed that the façade easement they donated had no
value and they nonetheless claimed a sizable deduction for its donation).193
191. ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, at 37.
192. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
193. Before donating a façade easement with respect to their residence, the
Kaufmans expressed concern to the donee regarding an appraisal (prepared by an
appraiser the donee recommended) indicating that the easement would reduce the
value of their residence by $220,800. Kaufman II, 784 F.3d at 61. In response, a donee
representative assured the Kaufmans that the easement would not reduce the value of
their residence. Id. at 61–62. The Kaufmans also sent a form letter to their mortgage
lender noting that ‘“[t]he easement restrictions are essentially the same restrictions as
those imposed by current local ordinances.”’ Id. at 60. Despite these “warning signals”
the Kaufmans proceeded to claim a $220,800 deduction for the donation of the
easement. Id. at 62. In upholding the Tax Court’s imposition of gross valuation
misstatement penalties, the First Circuit explained that the Kaufmans were required to
“do some basic inquiry into the validity of an appraisal whose result was squarely
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The strict liability penalty for gross valuation misstatements was
imposed in four of the eleven recent cases, and in three of the cases, Reisner,
Chandler, and Zarlengo, the penalty was imposed only with regard to returns
filed after the penalty became a strict liability penalty. That penalties were
imposed in Reisner, Chandler, and Zarlengo only for the years in which the
penalty was a strict liability penalty illustrates that, absent patently abusive
behavior (as in Kaufman), taxpayers generally will avoid penalties in the
valuation context if the reasonable cause exception is available. This appears
to be due to the fact that valuation of easements is complex, “[a]verage
taxpayers would not know where to start to value a conservation easement,”
and, thus, reliance on professionals generally will be sufficient to qualify for
the exception.194
In addition, the author is aware of only two instances in which
appraisers have been sanctioned for overvaluing easements. In January 2013,
the Department of Justice filed a complaint in District Court against an
appraiser and the company he owned with his wife.195 The complaint alleged,
among other things, that the appraiser had repeatedly made errors, distorted
data, and provided misinformation and unsupported personal opinions in
façade easement appraisals to inflate the value of the easements for federal
deduction purposes. In February 2013, the District Court issued an Agreed
Order of Permanent Injunction that, among other things, barred the appraiser
(who reportedly had retired) and the company from preparing appraisal reports

contradicted by other available evidence glaringly in front of them.” Id. at 67. The
First Circuit noted that “[t]he Kaufmans were highly intelligent, very well-educated
people, and the Tax Court reasonably found that developments casting doubt on the .
. . appraisal should have alerted them that they needed to take further steps to assess
their ‘proper tax liability.’” Id. at 68-69. The First Circuit also noted that cases in which
the courts have declined to impose penalties were not inconsistent with its conclusion
to impose penalties in Kaufman because there were no “red flags” suggesting the
easements had no value in those other cases. Id. at 68.
194. See, e.g., Chandler, 142 T.C. at 295 (because of the complexity of
easement valuations “even well-educated taxpayers . . . must rely heavily on the
opinions of professionals”); Whitehouse Hotel, 755 F.3d at 250 (valuation is a difficult
task and it is even more complicated when, as here, the valuation is divorced from a
negotiated transaction between a buyer and seller; “[o]btaining a qualified appraisal,
analyzing that appraisal, commissioning another appraisal, and submitting a
professionally-prepared tax return is sufficient to show a good faith investigation as
required by law”).
195. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, United States
v. Ehrmann, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-214 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013) (filed pursuant to IRC §
7408); supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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or otherwise participating in the appraisal process for any property relating to
federal taxes.196
In March 2014, the IRS issued a press release announcing it had
entered into a settlement agreement with a group of appraisers from the same
firm who were accused of aiding in the understatement of federal tax liabilities
by overvaluing facade easements for charitable donation purposes.197 To value
the facade easements, the appraisers had applied a flat percentage diminution,
generally 15 percent, to the before-values of the subject properties, rather than
considering the particular facts and circumstances of each property and the
particular easement restrictions imposed.198 The appraisers agreed to a fiveyear suspension from preparing any appraisals that could subject them to
penalties under the Code.199
F.

Summary

The existing case law involving challenges to the valuation of façade
easements suggests that overvaluation has been a persistent problem in this
context and that it has worsened in recent years. The case law also indicates
that façade easements on residential properties generally have less effect on
value than façade easements on commercial properties, and a façade easement
on a residential property that is already subject to local historic preservation
laws is likely either to have no impact on the fair market value of the property,
196. See Agreed Order of Permanent Injunction, United States v. Ehrmann,
Civ. No. 1:13-cv-00214-DAP (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2013) (the appraiser and company
agreed to the settlement without admitting any wrongdoing); see also Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Ohio Federal Court Bars Appraiser of Historic-Preservation
Easements, (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-tax192.html.
197. IR-News Rel. 2014-31, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-BarsAppraisers-from-Valuing-Facade-Easements-for-Federal-Tax-Purposes-for-FiveYears [hereinafter IRS Bars Appraisers]. The appraisers admitted to violating
Treasury Department Circular No. 230, which provides regulations governing practice
before the IRS issued pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 330. See id.; supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
198. See IRS Bars Appraisers, supra note 197.
199. Id. The practice of using a flat diminution percentage to estimate the
value of a façade easement was apparently attributable, in part, to documents posted
on the IRS website suggesting a range within which a façade easement might be
expected to reduce the value of property. A 2007 Chief Counsel Advice explained that
such language was removed from those documents and those documents always
“made it clear that a full analysis of the value of the property both before and after the
donation was necessary. See C.C.A. 200738013, 2007 WL 2746198 (Aug. 9, 2007).
The Chief Counsel Advice also clarified that taxpayers may not use a diminution
percentage to value a façade easement. See id.; see also Scheidelman, 755 F.3d at 152
(taxpayer’s expert’s reliance on an IRS “accepted range” of values to determine the
value of a façade easement “was legally unfounded”).
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or to reduce the value of the property by only a modest percentage. The cases
further reveal that appraisers can inflate the value of a façade easement by
ignoring or understating the impact of existing historic preservation laws, by
using nonlocal comparables in a sales comparison approach, by manipulating
the income capitalization approach, and by inappropriately employing the
reproduction cost approach. Finally, the cases indicate that, unless a valuation
misstatement penalty is a strict liability penalty, it rarely will be imposed on
taxpayers because of their lack of expertise in evaluating easement appraisals.
In addition, appraisers appear to be subject to penalties only in rare cases of
patently abusive repeat behavior.
V.

CONSERVATION EASEMENT VALUATION CASE LAW

The twenty-eight cases involving the valuation of conservation
easements for charitable contribution deduction purposes are listed in
Appendix C. These cases can be usefully divided into two categories: (i) the
seventeen cases involving conservation easements donated between 1969 and
1994 (the early cases) and (ii) the eleven cases involving conservation
easements donated in 2000 and thereafter (the recent cases). As in the façade
easement context, an analysis of these cases, particularly the recent cases,
reveals some interesting trends.
A.

Persistent and Increased Overstatements

As indicated in Appendix C, in the seventeen early cases involving
donations of conservation easements, the taxpayers collectively overstated the
value of the easements by slightly more than $9.2 million or, on average, by
$511,744. In contrast, in the eleven recent cases, the taxpayers collectively
overstated the value of the easements by more than $24 million, or, on average,
by more than $1.5 million. Eight of the recent cases involved overstatements
of $1.1 million to $4.6 million, and two cases involved collective
overstatements (from more than one easement donation) of more than $2.1 and
$3.8 million, respectively.200
In the seventeen early cases, the taxpayers, on average, asserted values
for their easements that were close to two times (or 196 percent of) the values
the court determined to be correct. In contrast, in the ten recent cases, the
taxpayers, on average, asserted values for their easements that were ten times
(or 1,002 percent of) the court-determined correct values. In addition, in the
seventeen early cases, which involved nineteen conservation easement
donations, the taxpayers overstated the value of fourteen (or 74 percent) of the
200. See Esgar II, 744 F.3d 648; Butler, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1359, 2012
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-072.

2016]

Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum

267

nineteen easements. With regard to the remaining five donations, the taxpayers
were determined either not to have overstated or to have understated the value
of the easements. In contrast, in all eleven (100 percent) of the recent cases,
which involved sixteen donations, the taxpayers were determined to have
overstated the value of the easements.
The case law reflected in Appendix C suggests that overvaluation has
been a persistent problem in the conservation easement donation context. In
addition, the prevalence of overstatements in the recent cases, and the fact that
the taxpayers asserted values for their easements that were, on average, ten
times the court-determined correct values, suggest that the problem of
overstatements has worsened over time. It also is likely that the IRS has
become more skilled at ferreting out and litigating abuses.
B.

Common Methods of Abuse

The recent cases illustrate two of the more common ways that
taxpayers (or, more accurately, their appraisers) overstate the value of
conservation easements. The first is by asserting an unrealistic beforeeasement highest and best use for the subject property. The second is by
manipulating the subdivision development analysis. Both methods can be used
to exaggerate the before-value of the property, thereby inflating the value of
the easement.
1.

Unrealistic Before-Easement Highest and Best Use

As explained in Part II, a property’s highest and best use (HBU) is the
highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and needed
or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future.201 In four of the ten recent
cases, Hughes v. Commissioner, Boltar v. Commissioner, Esgar v.
Commissioner, and Mountanos v. Commissioner, the taxpayers’ valuation
experts asserted unrealistic before-easement HBUs for the subject properties.
The same was arguably true in Kiva Dunes, even though the Tax Court
accepted the before-easement HBU asserted by the taxpayer’s valuation
expert.
i.

Hughes v. Commissioner

Hughes involved the donation of a conservation easement
encumbering two parcels located in a rural part of Gunnison County,

201. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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Colorado.202 The valuation overstatement in Hughes related to only one of
those parcels: the 1,950-acre “Bull Mountain” parcel.203 Both the appraiser
who prepared the appraisal used to substantiate the taxpayer’s claimed
deduction and the appraiser who served as the taxpayer’s valuation expert at
trial asserted that the Bull Mountain parcel’s before-easement HBU was
residential development.204 The taxpayer’s expert at trial asserted that
“demand was so high that if the Bull Mountain parcel were subdivided into 39
parcels of 35 acres or more, the subdivided parcels could have sold within 5
years.”205 The expert also asserted that the Bull Mountain parcel had
appreciated in value by 128 percent in the fourteen months between the date
the taxpayer purchased parcel and the date he granted the easement (that is,
from approximately $1.54 million to approximately $3.5 million).206
The Tax Court disagreed, finding that, at the time of the easement’s
donation, there was “little to no demand” for residential property of the type
suggested by the taxpayer’s expert and no evidence that there would be such
demand in the near to intermediate future.207 Among other things, the court
pointed out that Gunnison County is about twice the size of Rhode Island, at
the time of the donation the county had an overall population density of only
4.3 people per square mile, and the area in which the Bull Mountain parcel
was located had a population density of less than one person per square mile.208

700.

202. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1488, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at

203. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1492–93, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094,
at 708. The taxpayer’s deduction with regard to the second parcel was limited by the
price he paid when he purchased the property (i.e., his basis in the property) because
he donated the easement less than a year after its purchase. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A)
(when a taxpayer grants a conservation easement over appreciated property held for
less than one year, the amount of the contribution is limited to the basis in the land
allocated to the easement).
204. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1494, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at
707–08 n.18.
205. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1494, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at
707.
206. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1493, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at
706.
207. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1494, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at
708.
208. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1489, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at
700. The taxpayer’s expert made additional assumptions that the court determined to
be inappropriate. The expert asserted that the $3.5 million before-value he ascribed to
the Bull Mountain parcel was justified because the owner of that parcel could use the
unrestricted access easement appurtenant to the other parcel encumbered by the
easement (that is, there was an “assemblage premium”). The Tax Court found this was
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The Tax Court concluded that the Bull Mountain parcel’s beforeeasement HBU was not residential development, but, rather, “continued
agricultural and recreational use.”209 In other words, the type of residential
development the taxpayer’s expert asserted was not “reasonably probable” in
the “reasonably near future.”210 The Tax Court also determined that the parcel
had appreciated in value by the time of the donation to only $1.71 million (or
by only 11 percent).211 Given the Bull Mountain parcel’s actual beforeeasement HBU, the Tax Court concluded that the restrictions in the easement,
which permitted only one single-family residential dwelling on the parcel,
“had much less effect” on the parcel’s value than the taxpayer’s expert
suggested (the taxpayer’s expert had asserted that the easement reduced the
value of the parcel by 70 percent).212

not the case, explaining that state law prohibited the taxpayer from using the other
parcel's access easement to benefit the Bull Mountain parcel. Hughes, 97 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1494, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at 708. The taxpayer’s expert also
asserted that the $1.54 million the taxpayer had paid for the Bull Mountain parcel
fourteen months before the easement donation had been a “discounted” price because
the seller had been in financial distress. However, the gentleman who sold the Bull
Mountain parcel to the taxpayer testified at trial that he had not been in financial
distress. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1495, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at 710.
The Tax Court also noted that the taxpayer’s expert’s work file contained the
handwritten notation “Nick wants it Bigger!!” next to a preliminary estimate of the
before-value the Bull Mountain parcel of only $2.4 to $2.7 million, with Nick being
Nick Hughes, the taxpayer. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1491, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2009-094, at 705 n.12.
209. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1492–93, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094,
at 707.
210. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
211. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1495, T.C.M. 2009 (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at
699.
212. Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1497, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at
712. Although the reasoning in Hughes is sensible, the ultimate result was not. The
IRS had asserted that the easement had a value of just over $1.99 million in its notice
of deficiency and it did not assert an increased deficiency at trial. Hughes, 97 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 1491, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at 704 n.10. Rather than determining
the extent to which the easement reduced the value of the two parcels, the court merely
sustained the IRS’s deficiency and allowed a deduction of just over $1.99 million.
Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1497, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at 712.That
deduction represented an 84 percent diminution in the court-determined $2.38 million
before-value of the two parcels, even though the Tax Court determined that a 70
percent diminution was “too high.” Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1498, 2009 T.C.M.
(RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at 713.
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Esgar v. Commissioner

Esgar involved the donation of conservation easements with respect
to three fifty-four-acre parcels in Prowers County, Colorado.213 The owners of
the parcels reported values for the easements of $570,500, $836,500, and
$867,500, respectively.214 Those values were based on an appraisal that
asserted that the before-easement HBU of the parcels was gravel mining.215
To support those values, the taxpayers offered experts at trial who used the
income capitalization approach to determine the parcels’ before-values (that
is, the appraisers estimated the future cash flows from hypothetical gravel
mining operations and then discounted those cash flows to present value).216
The Tax Court determined that the actual before-easement HBU of the parcels
was agriculture and the easements were worth only approximately $50,000
each.217 The taxpayers had thus claimed values for the easements that,
respectively, were more than eleven, sixteen, and seventeen times the values
the court determined to be correct.218
The Tax Court explained that the main question in Esgar was whether
it was reasonable to conclude that a hypothetical willing buyer would have
considered the parcels as a site for the construction of a gravel mine at the time
of the easement donations.219 The Tax Court found that this was not the case.220
The Tax Court determined and, on appeal, the 10th Circuit agreed that (i) there
was no unfulfilled demand for gravel in Prowers County at the time of the
donations, (ii) demand from the Front Range for Prowers County gravel was
not poised to increase in the reasonably foreseeable future, (iii) supply
produced by the four existing Prowers County gravel pits was sufficient to
satisfy any increases in demand, and (iv) transporting gravel via rail from
Prowers County to the Front Range was not a reasonably foreseeable
possibility.221 The 10th Circuit concluded that the Tax Court had applied the

274–75.
281.
281.

213.
214.
215.
216.

Esgar II, 744 F.3d at 650–51.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Esgar I, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1191, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-035, at

217. Esgar I, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1195, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-035, at
218. See infra app. C.
219. Esgar I, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1195, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-035, at
220. Id.
221. See Esgar II, 744 F.3d at 658.
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correct HBU standard by looking for the use that was “most reasonably
probable in the reasonably near future,” and that use was agriculture.222
The Tax Court also found, and the 10th Circuit affirmed, that the
before-value of the parcels should have been based on comparable sales of
agricultural lots.223 The Tax Court explained that the sales comparison
approach “is generally the most reliable indicator of value when there is
sufficient information about sales of properties similar to the subject
property.”224 On the basis of comparable sales, the Tax Court concluded that a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of any relevant facts, would
have placed before-easement values on the three properties of approximately
$74,000, $74,000, and $76,000, respectively.225 Those values contrasted
starkly with the before-easement values asserted by the taxpayer’s valuation
expert at trial of more than $625,000, $812,000, and $848,000, respectively,
based on an income capitalization approach that estimated the anticipated
royalty stream from hypothetical gravel mining operations and then
discounted that royalty stream to present value.226
iii.

Mountanos v. Commissioner

Mountanos involved the donation of a conservation easement
encumbering 882 acres of rugged undeveloped property in Lake County,
California.227 At the time of the donation, the property was (i) almost
completely surrounded by federal land, (ii) accessible only through
neighboring properties (the Bureau of Land Management had granted the
taxpayer limited access to the property for “single-family use”), and (iii)
subject to a Williamson Act contract under California law that strictly limited
its development and use.228 In addition, a permit was required to divert water
for private use from the creek flowing through the property.229
The taxpayer, who had purchased the property for recreational use,
such as deer hunting, claimed a $4.69 million deduction for the easement

284.
287–88.
276.

222. Id.
223. Id. at 652.
224. Esgar I, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1198, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-035, at
225. Esgar I, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1200, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-035, at
226. Esgar I, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1192, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-035, at

227. Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1818, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013138, at 1185.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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donation.230 The IRS objected, arguing, among other things, that the easement
was overvalued.231
At trial, the taxpayer’s three valuation experts asserted that the
property’s before-easement HBU was a combination of vineyard use and
residential development.232 The Tax Court disagreed, finding that the HBU of
the property both before and after the easement donation was for recreation.233
The Tax Court explained that the taxpayer failed to show that vineyard
use was legally permissible, physically possible, or economically feasible.234
Specifically, the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that the property had the
necessary legal access or water supply for vineyard use.235 The taxpayer also
failed to show that there was demand for vineyard-suitable property in the
county or to provide any data or analysis indicating that vineyard use was
economically feasible.236 The Tax Court further found that the taxpayer’s
experts failed to take into account the various legal restrictions that prohibited
use of the ranch for residential development—namely, the Williamson Act,
the Williamson Act contract, and a California code provision governing the
procedures for subdividing land.237 In other words, neither vineyard use nor
residential development was “reasonably probable” in the “reasonably near
future.”238
The Tax Court sustained the IRS’s complete disallowance of the
claimed deductions, explaining that, because the taxpayer failed to prove that
the HBU of the land before and after the easement donation differed, it
followed that the taxpayer failed to show that the easement reduced the value
of the land.239 Mountanos is on appeal in the 9th Circuit.

at 1191.

230. Id.
231. Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013-138,

232.
233.
at 1191–92.
234.
at 1191–92.
235.
at 1191–92.
236.
237.
238.
239.
at 1192.

Id.
Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013-138,
Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013-138,
Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013-138,
Id.
Id.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Mountanos, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013-138,
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Boltar v. Commissioner

Boltar involved a particularly egregious example of valuation
abuse.240 At issue in Boltar was a conservation easement donated with respect
to eight acres in Lake County, Indiana.241 The taxpayer claimed a $3.2 million
deduction for the donation based on an appraisal that asserted that the beforeeasement HBU of the eight acres was residential development—specifically a
174-unit condominium project consisting of twenty-nine buildings, each with
six units.242 The valuation experts who prepared the appraisal represented that
the hypothetical condominium project was legally permissible, physically
possible, financially feasible, and would be the maximally productive use of
the property.243 They also employed a subdivision development analysis to
estimate a before-value for the eight acres of more than $3.3 million (or more
than $400,000 per acre), despite acknowledging that comparable land nearby
was selling for only approximately $12,000 per acre.244
In rejecting the taxpayer’s appraisal, the Tax Court noted, among other
things, that the hypothetical 174-unit condominium project could not be
physically placed on the subject property (the site plan for the project assumed
ten acres whereas the subject property was only eight acres), the project was
not legally permissible (the taxpayer’s experts had erroneously assumed the
eight acres were zoned to allow the project when they were not), and
experience in the area and decreasing population negated the feasibility of and
demand for the type of dense development asserted by the taxpayer.245 In other
words, the 174-unit condominium project was not “reasonably probable” in
the “reasonably near future.”246 Rather, the court determined that the HBU of
the eight acres both before and after the easement’s donation was for singlefamily residential development.247
The Tax Court also explained that, while concept of “highest and best
use” is an element in the determination of fair market value, it does not
eliminate the requirement of showing that a hypothetical willing buyer would
actually purchase the subject property for the indicated value.248 “‘If a
hypothetical buyer would not reasonably have taken into account . . . [a]

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Boltar v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 326 (2011).
Id. at 328.
Id. at 327, 330.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 338–39.
Id. at 338, 340.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Boltar, 136 T.C. at 340.
Id. at 336.
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potential use in agreeing to purchase the property,’” explained the court,
“‘such potential use should not be considered in valuing the property.’”249
Finally, stressing the gatekeeping function of a trial court, the Tax
Court granted the IRS’s motion in limine to exclude the taxpayer’s experts’
appraisal report from evidence because it was “too speculative and unreliable
to be useful.”250 The court had harsh words for the taxpayer’s experts, noting
that the factual errors they made in the report demonstrated the “lack of sanity”
in their results, that their assertion of a $3.3 million before-value for the eight
acres “defie[d] reason and common sense,” and that their report was “so far
beyond the realm of usefulness” that excluding it served salutary purposes.251
The Tax Court further noted that, while “Justice is frequently portrayed as
blindfolded to symbolize impartiality,” a court “need not blindly admit absurd
expert opinions.”252 The Tax Court ultimately allowed only a $42,400
deduction for the donation, which was the amount the IRS had allowed in its
notice of deficiency.253
v.

Kiva Dunes v. Commissioner

Kiva Dunes involved a taxpayer’s asserted before-easement HBU that,
even though accepted by the Tax Court, does not appear to have been
“reasonably probable” in the “reasonably near future.”254 In 1994, a
partnership began developing a residential resort community on the Fort
Morgan Peninsula in Baldwin County, Alabama, which “is consistently ranked
as one of the most beautiful beach destinations in the United States.”255 The
planned resort community consisted of a gated residential subdivision with
163 lots (thirty on the beach) and a Jerry Pate-designed 141-acre golf course
known as the Kiva Dunes golf course.256 The planned resort community also

249. Id.
250. Id. at 326, 339–40.
251. Id. at 336, 339.
252. Id. at 336.
253. Id. at 327, 340–41. Although the IRS’s experts at trial determined that
the easement had a value of less than $42,400, as in Hughes, the IRS did not ask for
an increased deficiency.
254. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
255. Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. Commissioner, 97 T.C.M. (CCH)
1818, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145, at 1178 n.2 (2009).
256. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1818, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,
at 1178 n.3; see also JERRY PATE COMPANY, https://www.jerrypate.com.
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featured swimming pools, tennis courts, beach walkovers, and a private
beach.257
The Kiva Dunes golf course was completed during 1995 and soon
thereafter the partnership began selling individual residential lots.258 In 1996,
the golf course was rated the “No. 2 public golf course in the United States.”259
Six years later, a limited liability company (Kiva Dunes), which had been
formed by the partnership and to which the golf course had been transferred,
donated a conservation easement on the course to the North American Land
Trust.260 The easement permits the property to be used as a golf course, a park,
or an agricultural enterprise.261 Kiva Dunes claimed a deduction of more than
$30.5 million for the donation and the IRS challenged the deduction.262
The sole issue addressed by the Tax Court in Kiva Dunes was the value
of the easement.263 Each party’s valuation expert at trial concluded that the
before-easement HBU of the Kiva Dunes golf course was residential
subdivision (the taxpayer’s expert posited a 370-lot development while the
IRS’s expert posited a 300-lot development).264 Each expert also employed the
subdivision development analysis to estimate the before-value of the property.
The Tax Court noted that “[t]he differences in their assumptions led to a
dramatic difference in their respective before value estimates[,]” with the
taxpayer’s expert asserting a before-value of more than $31.9 million, and the
IRS’s expert asserting a before-value of only approximately $10 million.265
The Tax Court reviewed the various assumptions made by the two
experts in their subdivision development analyses.266 The Tax Court found the
taxpayer’s expert to be credible, his assumptions reasonable and amply
supported by the evidence, and his analysis persuasive.267 In contrast, the
257. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1818, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,
at 1178 n.3; see also infra note 276 and accompanying text.
258. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1819, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,
at 1178.
259. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1819, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,
at 1178 n.2.
260. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1818, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,
at 1178.
261. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1818, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,
at 1179 n.5.
262. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1818, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,
at 1179.
263. Id.
264. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1818, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,
at 1181.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1822–23, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009145, at 1184.
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IRS’s expert made a number of errors, his testimony at trial was inconsistent
with his report in several respects, and the court concluded that his
assumptions were not realistic.268 Ultimately, the court sided with the
taxpayer’s expert with regard to the before-value, adjusted his after-value
(which was based on comparable sales of unimproved real estate) upward to
reflect the cost of turning unimproved real estate into a comparable golf
course, and accepted his determination that the easement enhanced the value
of other property owned by the taxpayer by $300,000.269 Based on those
estimates, the court determined that the fair market value of the easement was
slightly more than $28.6 million.270
The Tax Court’s conclusion that Kiva Dunes was entitled to a $28.6
million deduction for placing a conservation easement on a golf course
prompted the Treasury to propose eliminating the deduction for contributions
of easements on golf courses.271 In support of this proposal the Treasury argued
that “[t]he benefit of an easement on a private golf course, especially one that
is part of a luxury housing development, may accrue to a limited number of
users such as members of the course club or the owners of the surrounding
homes, not the general public”; construction and operation of a golf course
may result in environmental degradation; “[e]asements on golf courses are
particularly susceptible to overvaluation”; and there may be indirect benefits
to the donor, “such as the increase in the value of home sites surrounding the
golf course.”272
Whether the Treasury’s criticisms justify eliminating the deduction for
all conservation easements donated with respect to golf courses is beyond the
scope of this Article.273 There is, however, a troubling aspect to Kiva Dunes
at 1183.
at 1187.

268. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1822, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,
269. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1825, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-145,

270. Id.
271. See 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 189; DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015
REVENUE PROPOSALS 195 (Mar. 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf; DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014
REVENUE PROPOSALS 161 (Apr. 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf; DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE
PROPOSALS 140 (Feb. 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf.
272. See, e.g., 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 189.
273. It appears that in some circumstances golf courses can provide
important environmental and open space benefits. See, e.g., Health of Ecosystems on
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that relates directly to valuation abuse. As noted above, as part of his beforeeasement subdivision development analysis (which the Tax Court accepted),
the taxpayer’s expert determined that the before-easement HBU of the golf
course was a 370-lot residential subdivision. The Tax Court noted that the
planning and zoning director of the local zoning board agreed with that
assumption, but it is not clear from the opinion if the development would have
required rezoning or other approvals.274 The taxpayer’s expert also assumed
that the owners of the 370 lots would have access to the amenities of the
adjacent 163-lot Kiva Dunes resort community, including use of its tennis
courts, swimming pools, beach walkovers, and private beach.275
Although apparently not posited by the IRS and thus not discussed by
the Tax Court, it is reasonable to assume that the well-heeled individuals who
purchased lots in the gated Kiva Dunes resort community would have been
upset by the prospect of conversion of the golf course into a 370-lot residential
development. Not only would those individuals, just a short time after
purchasing their lots, have faced losing the “award winning” golf course that
was the centerpiece of their resort community, they also would have faced
having the course replaced by a residential development with more than two
U.S. Golf Courses Better than Predicted, Researchers Find, SCIENCE DAILY, Apr. 10,
2014, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/04/
140410122201.htm (in a study of ten golf courses, researchers at the University of
Missouri determined that golf courses can offer a viable habitat for stream salamanders
and enhanced management practices may be beneficial to ecosystems); Laura
McCrystal, In the Rough: Golf Courses Now Developers’ Targets, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, July 19, 2015 (“‘Golf courses are starting to be called the last frontier of
open-space preservation in suburban communities.’"); but see Atkinson, 110 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 550, 2015 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2015-236, at 1701 (denying $7.88 million of
deductions claimed with regard to conservation easements on pesticide-ridden golf
course fairways, greens, teeing grounds, ponds, and other areas in a gated community;
the court determined that the easements did not satisfy either the habitat or open space
conservation purposes tests). To guard against abuse and ensure public benefit, a
deduction could be made available for an easement on a golf course in only limited
circumstances—e.g., where the easement mandates perpetual use of practices that
ensure protection of significant habitat and provides open space accessible by the
general public.
274. See Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1821, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009145, at 1181; cf., Dawn M. Meyers, Fore! How to Convert Golf Courses, Construction
Today, http://www.construction-today.com/index.php/sections/columns/1124-forehow-to-convert-golf-courses [hereinafter Meyers, Fore!] (“In most communities, golf
courses are zoned as commercial, recreational or green, open or park space. The
development of these spaces into a residential use requires a rezoning of the land. This
carries with it the typical land use change obstacles of neighborhood opposition,
reassessment of impacts and compatibility analysis.”).
275. Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1819 n.3, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009145, at 1178 n.3.
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times the number of lots in their gated community. And, to add insult to injury,
it was posited that they would have to share their other amenities (their tennis
courts, swimming pools, beach walkovers, and private beach) with the owners
of the new lots. Rather than 163 households sharing those amenities, 533
households would do so.276
Bitter neighborhood opposition to the proposed conversion of golf
courses to residential development is not unusual, and has played out across
the country as countless golf courses have closed due to economic hardship.277
Community members have leaned on public officials to maintain golf courses
as open spaces because they count on the courses for their views, their
recreation, and their property values.278 They have argued that the new
follows:

276. The Kiva Dunes website describes the gated resort community as
Kiva Dunes is an elite, one-of-a-kind coastal community, and life
here includes access to unmatched golfing and amenities. Only at
Kiva Dunes can you experience the #1 rated course in Alabama and
one of the country’s top golf courses. Mere yards away from our
championship course we have crystal-clear pools, a tiki bar, and a
restaurant with an extensive menu. Just outside your door you can
enjoy our gorgeous—and secluded—sugary-white sand beach and
the amazing Gulf Coast sunsets. So why wait? Choose your new
home now.

See Real Estate, KIVA DUNES, http://www.kivadunes.com/real-estate-sales/housesfor-sale/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); see also Private Paradise, KIVA DUNES,
http://www.kivadunes.com/explore-kiva/kiva-beaches/ (“[W]e at Kiva Dunes are
fortunate to be blessed with more than half a mile of our own private beach—over
3,000 feet of stunningly beautiful sun-kissed sand outlined by rolling dunes and
turquoise blue waters. Our secluded beach offers complete privacy in an awe-inspiring
atmosphere . . .”).
277. On golf course closures, see Michael Buteau, U.S. Golf Course
Closures Exceed Openings for Eighth Year, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, Jan. 16, 2014,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-16/golf-course-closings-outpaceopenings-for-eighth-straight-year; Brad Tuttle, Fore! No Make that Five!, 5 Reasons
Golf is in a Hole, MONEY, June 13, 2014, http://time.com/money/2871511/golf-dyingtiger-woods-elitist/ (golf is declining in popularity because people do not have
sufficient leisure time to play eighteen holes; golf is expensive and elitist; golf is an
“old man’s sport;” golf is difficult and not immediately rewarding; and the Tiger
Woods “golf bubble” has popped).
278. See Maya Rodriguez, It’s Been a Golf Course for Decades, but the
Applewood Golf Course near Golden Could become the site of a 450 New Homes,
KUSA, March 4, 2015, http://www.9news.com/story/news/2015/03/04/neighborsobject-to-golf-course-rezoning/24399415/ (“On Tuesday night, so many people came
to a zoning meeting about Applewood Golf Course, that they couldn't all fit inside the
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development would exacerbate existing traffic problems, further crowd
schools, and be contrary to a jurisdiction’s long-term planning.279 In some
locations, they have been successful in forcing developers to scale back on the
number of lots and increase protected open space, or drop development plans
altogether.280
Accordingly, while the Kiva Dunes golf course may have been
physically suitable for a 370-lot development, it is not at all clear that there
“existed a reasonable probability the property would be so used in the
reasonably near future,” or that a hypothetical willing buyer would have
considered the property as the site for such use at the time of the easement’s
donation.281 A willing buyer considering purchasing the course to convert it
into a 370-lot subdivision would have considered the prospect of
neighborhood opposition and, at a minimum, factored in the cost, time, and
risks associated with that opposition (including the risk of having to scale back
the development significantly) in settling on a purchase price.282 Even if
neighborhood opposition would not have precluded conversion of the course
into a 370-lot residential subdivision, it likely would have had a significant
impact on the purchase price a willing buyer would have paid for the land.283
venue at Manning Middle School. The meeting had to be postponed.”); Jenna Ross,
Golf Courses Make Good Neighbors, Until Owners Want to Sell, STAR TRIBUNE, Feb.
4,
2008,
http://www.startribune.com/golf-courses-make-good-neighbors-untilowners-want-to-sell/15265596/ (‘“Let’s face it: City councils are very sensitive to the
mass of residents rather than the single interest of the golf course owner . . . You've
got one voter versus 100[,]”’ quoting Executive Director of the Midwest Golf Course
Owners Association).
279. See, e.g., Earl Rinehart, Neighbors in Dublin Oppose Homes on Site of
Riviera Golf Club, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 14, 2014 (“Dublin residents from
several neighborhoods told the city’s planning and zoning commission last night that
they don’t want a golf course in their midst transformed into a 284-home
development.”).
280. See, e.g., Jeff Ferrell, Developer Cancels Plans for Former Benton Golf
Course, KSLA NEWS 12 SHREVEPORT, May 21, 2015; Rich Van Wyk, Carmel
Gramercy
Project
Rescaled,
13
WTHR
EYEWITNESS
NEWS,
http://www.wthr.com/story/5380767/carmel-gramercy-project-rescaled (neighbors
signed petitions against development of a golf course and the developer substantially
changed the original plan; the revised project calls for 50 individual homes instead of
150 townhomes as well as two more acres of parkland).
281. See supra notes 37 and 40 and accompanying text.
282. A blog for developers cautions: “[a] conversion of a golf course . . .
carries with it an extra layer of angst. Many developments were created with a golf
course centerpiece, and many lots were sold with boasts of golf-course views.
Neighbors will feel a sense of possessiveness toward the golf course as if its continued
existence is a matter of right.” Meyers, Fore! (also discussing environmental
contamination issues and other non-traditional costs).
283. See EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 105; Dep’t of
Transp. v. Great Southern Enterprises, 225 S.E. 2d 80, 83 (Ga. 1976) (“[T]he fact that
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The parties’ valuation experts should have considered these factors in
determining the before-easement HBU of the golf course as well as its beforevalue.
Hughes, Esgar, Mountanos, Boltar, and Kiva Dunes illustrate that
appraisers may assert unrealistic before-easement HBUs to exaggerate the
before-easement value of the subject properties and, thus, inflate the value of
the easements. Specifically, asserting an unrealistic before-easement HBU for
a subject property enables the appraiser to use inappropriate comparables in a
sales comparison approach and inappropriate assumptions in an income
capitalization or subdivision development analysis. An appraiser who asserts
an unrealistic HBU sets a course for an appraisal that will depart materially
from the task at hand: to estimate the price at which the property, before the
easement donation, would have changed hands between the hypothetical
willing buyer and willing seller. The appraiser should be estimating the price
at which the donor realistically could sell the subject property before the
easement donation in the open market. In each of Hughes, Esgar, Mountanos,
Boltar, and Kiva Dunes, the taxpayer’s valuation expert seemed to have lost
sight of this most basic of valuation principles.
2.

Manipulation of Subdivision Development Analysis

Trout Ranch, LLC v. Commissioner illustrates the complex and
manipulable nature of the subdivision development analysis.284 Trout Ranch
involved the conveyance of a conservation easement encumbering 85 percent
of a 453-acre parcel in Gunnison County, Colorado, known as Gunnison River
Ranch (the Ranch).285 The taxpayer, a partnership, purchased the Ranch in
2003 with plans to develop a residential subdivision using Gunnison County’s
“Large Parcel Initiative Process.”286 Pursuant to that process, the partnership
was granted the right to subdivide the property into twenty-one three-acre
residential lots and an additional lot for a clubhouse in exchange for conveying
a conservation easement to a local land trust that would permanently preserve
the property is merely adaptable to a different use is not in itself a sufficient showing
in law to consider such different use as a basis for compensation. It must be shown
that such use of the property is so reasonably probable as to have an effect on the
present value of the land.”).
284. Trout Ranch 1, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, aff’d 493 Fed. Appx. 944.
285. Trout Ranch 1, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 582, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1719.
286. Trout Ranch 1, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 582, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1718.
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85 percent of the Ranch for conservation purposes.287 The twenty-one lots
were situated along the Gunnison River and the lot owners were granted access
to a host of shared amenities, including the clubhouse, a boat house, riding
stables, duck blinds, an archery range, and three ponds.288 The lot owners also
had access to the conserved land and the river.289 The partnership claimed a
deduction for the easement conveyance of $2,179,849 and the IRS challenged
the claimed deduction.290
At trial, the partnership relied on the report of one valuation expert
and the IRS relied on the reports of two experts.291 All three experts agreed,
and the Tax Court accepted, that the HBU of the Ranch both before and after
the easement’s conveyance was residential subdivision.292 All three experts
also employed the subdivision development analysis to calculate the before
and after values of the property.293 Finding a lack of comparable market sales
287. Id.
288. Trout Ranch 1, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 582, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1719.
289. Trout Ranch II, 493 Fed. Appx. 944, 946.
290. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-283,
at 1717. At the time of the donation of the easement, the partnership could have
subdivided the Ranch into twelve thirty-five-acre lots as a matter of right. Trout Ranch
I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 587, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-283, at 1725. However, the
Large Parcel Initiative Process permitted twenty-two three-acre lots, provided the
partnership permanently protected 85 percent of the Ranch. Id. Accordingly, in
exchange for its conveyance of the conservation easement, the partnership received
the right to subdivide the property into ten additional lots (twenty-two instead of
twelve). The partnership’s receipt of this quid pro quo was taken into account in the
valuation process, in which the experts and the court determined that the value of the
easement was the difference between the before- and after-values of the entire
contiguous parcel (even though the contiguous parcel rule was not mentioned in the
opinion). Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 585–92, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1723–34. The after-value of the entire contiguous parcel reflected the added
value of the extra lots, thus reducing the value of the easement.
291. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 583, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1720.
292. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 585, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1723. Unlike the two parcels in Hughes, the Ranch was situated between the
towns of Gunnison and Crested Butte, which contained approximately half of the
county’s total population. See Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1488, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA)
¶ 2009-094, at 699. In addition, the “crown jewel” of the property was two miles of
frontage on the Gunnison River, “a stream beloved by fisherman for its world-class
Rainbow and German Brown Trout.” Trout Ranch II, 493 Fed. Appx. at 946.
293. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 585, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1723. The taxpayer’s expert also relied on the sales prices of purportedly
comparable easements. The Tax Court found use of that valuation method
inappropriate because there was “no substantial record of sales of easements
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of similar properties, the Tax Court agreed that the subdivision development
analysis was the most appropriate way to value the Ranch both before and after
the donation.294 However, because the Tax Court found “none of the experts
completely convincing,” it constructed its own subdivision development
analyses to calculate the before and after values of the Ranch.295
The Tax Court first focused on the subdivision development analyses
that the experts constructed to estimate the after-value of the Ranch.296 The
Tax Court agreed with the experts that the HBU of the Ranch after the
imposition of the easement was a twenty-one-lot shared amenities ranch.297
The Tax Court then engaged in a detailed review of each component of the
experts’ subdivision development analyses and came to its own conclusion
regarding each component.298
With regard to the assumed price of the lots to be sold, the court
rejected the taxpayer’s expert’s asserted per-lot price of $300,000 as too low
and the IRS’s experts’ asserted per-lot prices of $550,000 and $630,000 as too
high, and settled on an assumed per-lot lot price of $490,000.299 With regard
to absorption rate, the court rejected the taxpayer’s expert’s assumed rate as
“slightly aggressive” and one of the IRS’s expert’s assumed rates as
“sluggish,” and adopted the other IRS expert’s assumed rate of four to five lots
sale a year.300 With regard to appreciation in the selling prices of the lots, the
court rejected the taxpayer’s expert’s assumption that the lots would appreciate
at a rate of 15 percent a year for the first four years and then stop appreciating
as “unwarranted.”301 The Tax Court also rejected the assumed appreciation
rates of the two IRS experts of 4 percent and 8 percent as too low, and settled
on an appreciation rate of 10 percent a year.302

comparable to the donated easement.” Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 584, 2010
T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-283, at 1721.
294. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 585, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1723.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 586, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1724–25.
298. Id.
299. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 586–89, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2010-283, at 1725–27.
300. Id.
301. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 589, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1727.
302. Id.
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With regard to capital expenses, the court accepted the taxpayer’s
expert’s estimate of $2.18 million.303 With regard to project management
expenses (for marketing and advertising), the court adopted one of the IRS’s
expert’s estimates of 10 percent of gross revenues.304 With regard to sales
expenses, the court rejected the experts’ assumptions of 6 percent, 7 percent,
and 10 percent, and assumed sales expenses of 8 percent of gross sales
revenues.305 With regard to the developer’s anticipated profit, the court
adopted one of the IRS expert’s assumption of a 15 percent profit, rejecting
the other IRS’s expert’s assumption of a 25 percent profit (which appeared to
include project management expenses) and the taxpayer’s assumption of a 12
percent profit (which the court noted was not even within the range that the
expert had asserted in his report).306 With regard to discount rate, the court
rejected one of the IRS’s expert’s assumed rate of 10 percent and adopted the
15 percent rate assumed by the two other experts.307 The court then
constructed its own subdivision development analysis from this data and
concluded that the twenty-one-lot shared amenities ranch had an after-value of
approximately $3.89 million.308
The Tax Court engaged in a similar process to estimate the beforevalue of the Ranch.309 The Tax Court assumed, without explanation, that the
before-easement HBU of the Ranch was a forty-lot residential subdivision.310
After marching through each of the components of the analysis a manner
similar to that described above, the Tax Court constructed its own subdivision
development analysis from the data and concluded that the before-value of the
Ranch at the time of the easement’s donation was $4.45 million.311 The Tax
Court thus concluded that the value of the easement was $560,000, or

303. Id.
304. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 589, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1728.
305. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 589–90, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2010-283, at 1727–30.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 589–90, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2010-283, at 1730. The court’s subdivision development analyses are included in an
appendix to its opinion.
309. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 590–92, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2010-283, at 1730–32.
310. Id. It is not clear why the court assumed that the before-easement HBU
of the Ranch was a forty-lot subdivision rather than the twenty-two-lot shared
amenities ranch that the partnership actually developed.
311. Id.
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approximately one fourth of the $2,179,849 value that the partnership had
reported on its tax return.312
Trout Ranch, like Kiva Dunes, illustrates that even minor alterations
in the assumptions used in a subdivision development analysis can create large
variances in the ultimate values determined.313For example, the taxpayer’s
expert’s subdivision development analysis resulted in a before-value for the
Ranch of $5.6 million, while the Tax Court’s analysis resulted in a beforevalue of only $4.45 million.314 In addition, the taxpayer’s expert’s analysis
resulted in an after-value for the Ranch of only $2.6 million, while the Tax
Court’s analysis resulted in an after-value of $3.89 million.315 Given the onesided nature of the valuation process and the manipulability of the subdivision
development analysis, it is not surprising that a taxpayer’s appraiser will often
use assumptions that favor the taxpayer and result in a significant
overstatement of the value of the easement. Trout Ranch is a good example;
the partnership reported a value for its easement that was close to four times
the value the court determined to be the correct value.
Moreover, the complexity and seeming precision of a subdivision
development analysis can obscure the fact that the analysis relies on multiple
assumptions, many of which are impossible to predict with reasonable
accuracy. It also obscures the basic question to be answered—at what price
would the subject property change hands between the hypothetical willing
buyer and willing seller? As noted in a treatise on valuation for eminent
domain purposes: “The court’s resistance to admitting the [subdivision]
development approach stems from a fear that testimony in regard to the
approach may mislead the trier of fact into determining just compensation
based on a fully developed subdivision, rather than the land as it existed on the
date of the taking.”316 This same danger exists in the charitable donation
context.
C.

Palmer Ranch v. Commissioner—Eyebrow Raiser

In 2006, Hugh Culverhouse Jr., son of the longtime owner of the
Tampa Bay Buccaneers, through a partnership, donated a conservation
easement on eighty-two acres in Sarasota County, Florida (known as the B-10
312. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 592, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010283, at 1732
313. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
314. Trout Ranch I, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 590–92, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2010-283, at 1730, 1732.
315. Id.
316. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION, supra note 52, at 257.
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parcel) to the county.317 The partnership claimed a deduction of over $23.9
million for the donation and the IRS challenged the claimed deduction.318 In
Palmer Ranch, the partnership’s valuation expert argued, and the Tax Court
agreed, that there was a reasonable probability at the time of the donation that
the B-10 parcel could be rezoned to permit the development of 360
multifamily dwelling units and, thus, that the before-easement HBU of the
parcel was such development.319 The Tax Court also accepted the
partnership’s valuation expert’s estimate of the before-value of the parcel, with
a slight downward adjustment to just over $21 million.320 The court further
agreed with the partnership’s expert that the easement reduced the value of the
parcel by 95 percent.321 Accordingly, the Tax Court found that the easement
had a value of approximately $19.9 million.322
Palmer Ranch raises eyebrows for a number of reasons. First, the
deduction allowed—$19.9 million, which represented a 95 percent reduction
in the value of the eighty-two-acre parcel—seems outsized. Second, it is not
clear from the opinion that the partnership’s valuation expert took into account
the costs, time, and risks associated with obtaining rezoning approval in
estimating the before-value of the parcel. And third, the parties appear to have
failed to consider whether the donation of the easement increased the value of
other property owned by the partnership in the area (that is, there is no mention
in the opinion of the entire contiguous parcel and enhancement rules).
While, at first blush, a 95 percent reduction in the value of the B-10
parcel seems high, as indicated in Appendix D, that reduction is consistent
with other cases involving easements that severely limit or prohibit the
development of the property.323 Once encumbered by the easement, the B-10
317. Palmer Ranch v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408, 2014 T.C.M.
(RIA) ¶ 2014-79, at 587.
318. Id.
319. Palmer Ranch, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 201479, at 593.
320. Palmer Ranch, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 201479, at 594.
321. Id.
322. Id. Unsatisfied with this deduction, Mr. Culverhouse appealed the Tax
Court’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit. On February 5, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit
issued its opinion affirming the Tax Court’s decision in part and reversing and
remanding in part. See Palmer Ranch v. Commissioner, 812 F.3d 982 (11th Cir. 2016).
For a critique of the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, which, similar to the Tax Court’s
opinion, did not address certain key appraisal principles and rules, see Palmer Ranch
v. Comm’r—11th Circuit Remands Conservation Easement Valuation to Tax Court,
Nonprofit Law Prof Blog, http://bit.ly/1U4cJOQ. At the time of publication of this
article, the Tax Court had not issued its opinion on remand.
323. The Kiva Dunes easement resulted in a 90 percent reduction in value
and the Stotler easement resulted in a 91 percent reduction in value. See infra app. D.
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parcel could be used only for public recreational or agricultural purposes and,
given that the parcel is surrounded by an urban community, the court noted
that the parcel “did not lend itself” to agricultural use.324 The court also noted
that the easement restrictions limit a potential purchaser of the parcel to either
a nonprofit organization or the state of Florida.325
A $19.9 million deduction with regard to an easement on an eighttwo-acre parcel also seems high. As indicated in Appendix D, the Palmer
Ranch easement had the highest per-acre easement value of all of the
easements involved in the valuation cases thus far ($243,354 per acre), beating
out even the Kiva Dunes golf course easement (which had a $203,234 per-acre
value). However, according to the Tax Court’s opinion, the B-10 parcel was
located in a developed area, it was itself developable, and comparable lands in
the area were selling for substantial per-acre prices.326 Accordingly, assuming
those factors, prohibiting development of the eighty-two-acre parcel and
effectively committing it to public park and conservation uses could be
expected to have substantial price tag.
The more troubling aspects of Palmer Ranch, discussed below, relate
directly to aspects of the valuation methodology employed.
1.

Not Accounting for Costs, Time, and Risks Associated With
Rezoning

At the time of the donation of the conservation easement in Palmer
Ranch, zoning laws limited development of the B-10 parcel to forty-one
single-family residential lots, or one lot per two acres.327 As noted above, the
partnership’s valuation expert argued, and the Tax Court agreed, that rezoning
of the parcel to permit 360 multifamily dwelling units was reasonably probable
and, thus, that such development was the B-10 parcel’s before-easement HBU.
Setting aside the question of whether such rezoning was reasonably
probable—a determination that should entail particularly “careful scrutiny”
given that it is “fertile ground for the unscrupulous, the naïve, and the
dreamer”328—it is not clear from the Tax Court’s opinion if the comparable

at 589.

324. Palmer Ranch, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) 2014-79,

325. Id. As of the date of the Tax Court’s opinion, the parcel was being used
as a public park, a community garden, a conservation area, and preserved open space.
326. Id. at 591–595.
327. Id. at 595.
328. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Rezoning seemed more
probable in Palmer Ranch than in Kiva Dunes, given that in Kiva Dunes bitter
neighborhood opposition to development of the golf course was a virtual certainty.
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sales used to determine the before-value of the B-10 parcel were of parcels
that similarly had not been rezoned, or if the costs, time delays, and risks
associated with obtaining rezoning approval were otherwise taken into
account.329
The Tax Court noted that obtaining approval to rezone the B-10 parcel
would have involved a five-step process: (i) a preapplication meeting with
County staff, (ii) a neighborhood workshop with adjacent property owners,
(iii) submitting of applications to the county, which would be subject to staff
review, (iv) public hearings by a lay body (the planning commission), and (v)
a public hearing by the board of county commissioners, wherein the
commissioners would take final action.330 Even if the commissioners
approved the rezoning, the determination would still have been subject to
circuit court review.331 In addition, to receive rezoning approval, the
applications would have to be consistent with a master development order as
well as the local comprehensive plan, zoning regulations, and land
development regulations.332
As discussed in Part II.D above, under no circumstances should
property that is determined to have a reasonable probability of rezoning be
valued as if it were already rezoned.333 The risk of being denied rezoning, or
that an exaction or other condition could be placed on the rezoning, always
exists and must be taken into account.334 The time delay and costs associated
However, rezoning seemed less probable in Palmer Ranch than in Schmidt v
Commissioner, given that the taxpayer in Schmidt had submitted rezoning and
preliminary plan applications to the relevant authorities and had been able to address
all relevant issues that could have prevented or delayed the granting of the requested
development entitlements. See Schmidt v. Commissioner, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 135,
2014 T.C.M. (RIA) 2014-159, at 1112; see also Akers v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 243,
245–46 (6th Cir. 1986) (record did not support taxpayer’s contention that property
could easily have been subdivided and sold as smaller parcels); Turner, 126 T.C. 303–
05 (rezoning was not assumed because it would have been time-consuming and costly
and likely required the taxpayer to agree to a proffer and possible additional
conditions); Stotler v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 973, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 87, 275
at n.6 (1987) (record supported taxpayer’s contention that a low-density subdivision
“would probably have received approval”).
329. Palmer Ranch, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 201479, at 591–593; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining that finding
true comparable sales in this context is difficult because properties are typically sold
to developers only after rezoning approvals have been obtained).
330. Palmer Ranch, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1408, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 201479, at 590.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
334. Palmer Ranch, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1408, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 201479, at 590.
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with the rezoning process must also be considered.335 A willing buyer, under
no compulsion to buy and with reasonable knowledge of all relevant facts,
would have considered these factors in settling on a purchase price for the B10 parcel. The buyer would not have agreed to take on the risks, time delays,
and costs associated with the rezoning process without appropriate
compensation (that is, a discount in the purchase price of the parcel).336 That
the Tax Court did not discuss this in its opinion gives the reader less
confidence in the court’s conclusion that a willing buyer would have paid over
$21 million for the not-yet-rezoned B-10 parcel.
2.

Not Considering Taxpayer’s Other Properties

A second troubling aspect of Palmer Ranch was the apparent failure
to consider whether the easement donation increased the value of other
property owned by the partnership. At the time of the donation of the easement,
the partnership owned a thirty-nine-acre parcel “immediately to the north of”
the B-10 parcel (the B-9 parcel).337 If the B-9 parcel was contiguous to the B10 parcel, the deduction should have been equal to the difference between the
fair market value of the entire contiguous parcel (B-9 and B-10) before and
after the donation of the easement.338 If the B-9 parcel was not contiguous to
the B-10 parcel, the deduction should have been reduced by the amount (if
any) by which the donation of the easement increased the value of the B-9
parcel.339 It is impossible to tell from the Tax Court’s opinion whether
donating the easement on the B-10 parcel increased the value of the B-9 parcel.
It might have, however, and if it did the partnership’s deduction should have
been reduced accordingly. It was contrary to the conservation easementspecific valuation rules in the Regulations not to address this issue.
The uncertainty regarding whether the parties took into account the
costs, time, and risks associated with the rezoning process or the effect of the
easement on the partnership’s other properties is particularly troubling in
Palmer Ranch given the stakes—a $19.9 million deduction and the highest
per-acre easement value ($243,354) of all the conservation easement valuation
cases.

335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Palmer Ranch, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1408, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 201479, at 588–89.
338. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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Zero-Value Conservation Easements

In only one of the twenty-eight cases involving the valuation of
conservation easements analyzed in this Article—Mountanos—did the court
conclude that the easement had no value. Similar to the historic residences
subject to the zero-value façade easements discussed in Part IV, at the time of
the donation in Mountanos, the 882-acre parcel was already subject to
restrictions and other conditions that prevented its development (in the form
of a Williamson Act contract as well as limited access and water supply).
Accordingly, the court found that the easement did not further reduce the
parcel’s value.340
In
another
conservation
easement
case—Strasburg
v.
Commissioner—the Tax Court discussed a different scenario in which a
conservation easement might be found not to reduce the value of the subject
property.341 Strasburg involved the donation of a conservation easement
encumbering 320-acres in Sweet Grass, Montana, which the court described
as “a spectacular piece of property surrounded by the Gallatin National Forest
on three sides.”342
In determining the after-value of the property in Strasburg, the court
looked to five comparable sales analyzed by the parties’ experts.343 One such
sale indicated no loss in the value of the subject property as a result of being
encumbered by a conservation easement.344 The IRS’s valuation expert
explained this as follows:

340. Compare, e.g., Symington, 87 T.C. at 892 (rejecting IRS’s valuation
expert’s conclusion that the conveyance of the open-space easement had no adverse
affect on the fair market value of the subject property); Hughes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH)
1488, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-094, at 699 (disagreeing with the IRS’s valuation
expert’s conclusion that the conservation easement had no, or only a nominal, impact
on the fair market values of the subject parcels); Schwab v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M.
(CCH) 3004, T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 94,232 (1994) (finding the IRS’s valuation expert’s
determination that the easement had no value to be “untenable”).
341. Strasburg v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697, 2000 T.C.M.
(RIA) ¶ 2000-094, at 506.
342. Strasburg, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1698–99, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2000094, at 508–09.
343. Strasburg, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1704, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2000-094,
at 513–14. The comparable sales analyzed by the parties’ experts consisted of (i)
conservation easement sales, (ii) easement-encumbered property sales, and (iii)
“paired sales” of easement-encumbered properties. Id.
344. It is not clear from the court’s opinion if this comparable sale
constituted an easement-encumbered property sale or a paired sale. See supra note 343
and accompanying text.
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The Forest Service's aggressive program to buy in fee or
encumber all river front lands with conservation easements,
has severely restricted the supply of such lands. Thus the
remaining owners can ask almost whatever they want, with a
likelihood of getting their asking price. Even though a
property cannot be subdivided, it can serve as a country estate
for the well-to-do. . . . There is a portion of the buying public
who will acquire easement encumbered property without a
price discount even with restricted subdivision and
development opportunity. This is especially so if the property
supply is greatly restricted.345
In addition, the taxpayer’s valuation expert in Strasburg disclosed in
his report that he ‘“has analyzed and is aware of several sales in Montana,
Idaho and Wyoming which involved the sale of conservation easement
encumbered properties which have not reflected discounts at the time of
sale.”’346 He stated further that ‘“[t]hese easement properties are located in
high end development markets with very limited deeded land bases, and in
these areas large parcels are rarely exposed to the market.”’347 Accordingly,
while the easement at issue in Strasburg was determined to have reduced the
value of the 320 acres by 43 percent,348 in the right circumstances—a severely
limited supply of properties desirable for use as residential and recreational
estates—a conservation easement may not reduce the value of the property. In
such cases, the HBU of the property both before and after the easement
donation would be a residential and recreational estate, and a conservation
easement that prohibits subdivision and development while allowing such an
estate could have little or no effect on value.
E.

Penalties

As indicated in Appendix C, in the eleven recent conservation
easement valuation cases, which involved sixteen easement donations, the
taxpayers generally overstated the value of the easements by substantial
amounts in terms of dollar value (by more than $24 million collectively, and
on average, by more than $1.5 million per donation). However, valuation
at 513.
at 511.

345. Strasburg, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1703, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2000-094,
346. Strasburg, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1703, 2000 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2000-094,
347. Id.
348. See infra app. D.
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misstatement penalties were imposed in only two of the recent cases,
Mountanous and Legg v. Commissioner, each of which involved gross
valuation misstatements subject to the strict liability penalty.349 In three of the
remaining nine cases, Hughes, Trout Ranch, and SWF Real Estate v.
Commissioner, penalties were not addressed in the opinion, presumably
because the IRS did not assert penalties. In Boltar, the IRS did not assert
penalties in a timely manner. In the remaining five cases, penalties were not
imposed because the taxpayer qualified for the reasonable cause exception
(Esgar), the value the taxpayer reported was below the penalty threshold (Kiva
Dunes), or some combination of those factors (Palmer Ranch, Schmidt v.
Commissioner, Butler v. Commissioner).
For example, in Palmer Ranch, the taxpayer overstated the value of
the easement by more than $3.9 million but was able to avoid the negligence,
substantial understatement, and substantial valuation misstatement penalties
by qualifying for the reasonable cause exception. The taxpayer also was not
liable for the strict liability gross valuation misstatement penalty because the
amount claimed on its return with regard to the easement did not meet the
penalty threshold (it was not 200 percent or more of the value the court
determined to be the correct value). In fact, despite the substantial dollar value
of the overstatements in the recent cases, the values reported with respect to
only seven of the sixteen donations would constitute gross valuation
misstatements under the more stringent post-PPA penalty thresholds.
Moreover, in every recent case in which the reasonable cause exception was
available, the courts found that the taxpayers qualified for the exception. As in
the façade easement context, this appears to be due to the fact that valuation
of easements is complex, the average taxpayer has no expertise in valuing
conservation easements, and, thus, reliance on professionals is sufficient to
qualify for the exception.350
F.

Summary

The existing case law involving challenges to the valuation of
conservation easements suggests that, as in the façade easement context,
overvaluation has been a persistent problem and it has worsened in recent
years. The case law also indicates that appraisers can inflate the estimated
value of a conservation easement by asserting an unrealistic before-easement
349. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
350. See, e.g., Esgar I, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1200, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2012-035, at 288–89 (taxpayers qualified for the reasonable cause exception because
they relied in good faith on the advice of their accountant of twenty-five years and the
in-house lawyers in his firm); Butler, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1393, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA)
¶ 2012-072, at 563 (taxpayers qualified for the reasonable cause exception because
they relied on their longtime attorney and accountant, as well as appraisers who were
qualified and had experience appraising conservation easements).
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HBU for the subject property; by manipulating an income capitalization or
subdivision development analysis; by assuming rezoning when it is not
reasonably probable; by not accounting for the costs, times, and risks
associated with rezoning even when it is reasonably probable; and by not
considering whether the easement increases the value of the taxpayer’s other
properties. The case law further indicates that a conservation easement may
not always reduce the value of the subject property and, unless a valuation
misstatement penalty is a strict liability penalty, it rarely will be imposed
because taxpayers generally qualify for the reasonable cause exception.
VI.

REFORMS

As noted in the introduction, despite overvaluation and other abuses
in the § 170(h) deduction context, in 2015 Congress made the enhanced
incentives for conservation and façade easement donations a permanent part
of the Code. In so doing, Congress ignored the abuses revealed by the case law
and the Treasury’s calls for reforms. For the reasons noted in the introduction,
however, calls for reform can be expected to continue and to become more
acute. Accordingly, an analysis of proposed reforms is warranted.
Section A below discusses the Treasury’s proposed reforms to address
valuation abuse and why those reforms would likely be ineffective. Section B
then outlines alternative proposed reforms that are informed by the analysis of
the case law in this Article.
A.

Difficulties with Treasury’s Proposed Reforms

To address valuation abuse, the Treasury has proposed, among other
things, that the organizations accepting easement donations play a role in
policing the valuation of the easements. Specifically, the Treasury has
proposed that such organizations be subject to penalties and to the risk of
losing their status as donees eligible to accept tax-deductible easements if they
accept easements that they “know (or should know)” are “substantially”
overvalued.351 These proposed reforms are unlikely to significantly reduce
overvaluations for a number of reasons.
First, both donors and donees have an incentive to assert high values
for easements. Donors want the largest deduction possible to maximize their
tax benefits, and donees know that property owners are more likely to donate
if their easements are determined to have high values. Second, valuation is
more of an art than a science and there will always be a range of acceptable
values for an easement. Accordingly, it is likely to be difficult to determine
351. See 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 191.
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when a donee “knew” or “should have known” that an easement was
“substantially” overvalued in all but the most egregious of cases, making the
threats of penalties and loss of qualified organization status potentially empty
threats.
Third, the Treasury’s proposed reforms might compel donee
organizations to acquire their own appraisals of easements. Some donees may
not have sufficient funds to pay for appraisals and, even with respect to those
that do, the funds arguably would be better spent on additional conservation
and historic preservation efforts and on the monitoring and enforcement of
existing easements.352 Moreover, given that donee organizations have an
incentive to support high values for easements, the end result of compelling
donees to obtain appraisals may be that the IRS would find itself faced with
two opponents and two appraisals when challenging an easement’s
overvaluation.
The Treasury has also proposed that donees be required to
electronically report and publicly disclose information about easement
contributions, and that the deduction be eliminated with regard to easements
conveyed with respect to golf courses. Transparency through electronic
reporting and public disclosures would be an appropriate reform given that the
public investment in tax-deductible easements is considerable and the details
of that investment should be publicly available. Given that easement valuation
is a complex process with which most people have no familiarity or expertise,
however, such disclosures seem unlikely to curb valuation abuse except
perhaps at the outer margin, where the prospect of public shaming might chill
some of the most outrageous valuations. And while golf course easements
have been much maligned, the case law indicates that golf course easements
are not the only easements that are overvalued. Moreover, golf courses can
provide important habitat if they are properly managed and, in some locations,
constitute the only remaining open space.353 Accordingly, a more nuanced
approach to reforming the deduction in the case of golf course easements
should be considered.
Finally, the Treasury’s proposal to create a tax credit program as an
alternative to and eventual replacement of the § 170(h) deduction is troubling,
at least as it has been described.354 The voluminous case law in this context
evidences not only valuation abuse, but also persistent failures to satisfy the
requirements of § 170(h), which are designed to ensure that federallysubsidized easements will actually provide significant benefits to the public
352. The expenses associated with monitoring and enforcement can be
expected to increase over time as easements age and the encumbered lands change
hands.
353. See supra 273 and accompanying text.
354. See 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 190, 191–92.
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over the long term.355 There is a great deal of money to be made by
overvaluing easements, obtaining outsized deductions, and later releasing or
modifying the easement restrictions to permit previously prohibited
development.356 “[A]llowing larger tax benefits to be claimed with fewer
restrictions” and “the value of easements [to] be determined between the donor
and the qualified conservation organizations,” as the Treasury has proposed,357
would be a recipe for increased abuse. For example, one need only look to the
various audits of the Natural Resource Conservation Service’s easement
purchase programs to see that, without appropriate oversight and controls,
those programs have been subject to significant abuses, including by the
nonprofit organizations that participate in the programs. One of the audits
concluded that “relying on NGOs without maintaining oversight is not an
effective approach to ensuring program compliance.”358
355. See supra notes 8, 9, and 17 and accompanying text.
356. It was reported to the author that a well-known land trust advised a
landowner to donate a very restrictive conservation easement to maximize the amount
of landowner’s deduction, and the land trust would amend the easement once the
statute of limitations had run on the landowner’s deduction to permit the building of
ten house lots on the subject property. The extent to which this type of abuse is
occurring is difficult to determine given the current lack of transparency associated
with easement amendments.
357. See 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 190.
358. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, REP. NO. 10099-6-SF, AUDIT
REPORT, NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION SERVICE FARM AND RANCH LANDS
PROTECTION PROGRAM REVIEW OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 5, (July
2009) (finding, among other things, that nonprofit “cooperating entities” did not
comply with program rules and made misrepresentations in their certifications to the
Natural Resource Conservation Service). See also, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE,
REP. NO. 10601-0001-23, NRCS CONTROLS OVER LAND VALUATIONS FOR
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, (September 2015) (finding NRCS’s valuation and
payment processes did not meet appropriate standards and resulted in the payment of
more than $43 million for insufficiently supported easements); U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRICULTURE, REP. NO. 10601-0002-31, NRCS CONSERVATION EASEMENT
COMPLIANCE, (July 2014) (finding that NRCS was not consistently detecting and
reporting violations on easement-encumbered lands and recommending that NRCS
improve its stewardship practices to maintain the integrity of and safeguard the
easements); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, REP. NO. 10099-0001-31, NATURAL
RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE’S ADMINISTRATION OF EASEMENT PROGRAMS
IN WYOMING, (September 2013) (finding that program employees lacked critical
knowledge and the Wyoming office approved at least $14.1 million in easements that
were not correctly processed and did not ensure that the Government’s interest in the
easements would be served and secured); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, REP. NO.
10099-03-CH, CONTROLS OVER THE FARM AND RANCH LANDS PROTECTION
PROGRAM IN MICHIGAN, (September 2011) (finding serious problems with the
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To avoid exacerbating current abuses, any tax credit program would
have to include safeguards designed to ensure that (i) the easements are
accurately valued, (ii) the subject properties have unique or otherwise
significant conservation or historic values and the easements are drafted to
protect those values, and (iii) the protections will be durable (e.g., mortgages
are subordinated, comprehensive baseline documentation is obtained, holders
have sufficient resources and expertise to monitor and enforce, and there are
appropriate restrictions on and independent oversight of the transfer,
modification, and termination of the easements).359
B.

Alternative Proposed Reforms

Given the potential problems with the Treasury’s proposed reforms to
address valuation abuse, alternative reforms informed by the analysis of the
valuation case law should be considered. The following suggested reforms are
not listed in order of priority.
1.

Six-Year Statute of Limitations

The enhanced incentives, which are now permanent, are exceedingly
generous to a narrow class of charitable donors—those who donate
conservation or façade easements. Instead of being able to claim the deduction
generated by an easement donation only to the extent of 30 percent of the
donor’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in each of the year of the donation and
the following five years, easement donors are permitted to claim the deduction
to the extent of 50 percent of the donor’s AGI in each of the year of the
donation and the following fifteen years, or, for qualifying farmer and rancher
donations, 100 percent of the donor’s AGI in each of the year of the donation
appraisal processes and recommending the State office implement a number of
reforms); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, REP. NO. 10099-3-SF, AUDIT REPORT,
NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION SERVICE WETLANDS RESERVE PROGRAM,
COMPENSATION
FOR
EASEMENTS,
(August
2005),
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/10099-3-SF.pdf (finding that easements were
being significantly overvalued and that, if the National Resources Conservation
Service had changed one of its policies, it could have potentially saved the program
more than $159 million over a five year period).
359. If the § 170(h) qualification requirements were repealed or significantly
reduced, there would be little assurance that the easements acquired would provide
benefits to the public over the long term. Given that state laws and donee organization
policies, resources, and commitment to conservation vary widely and are subject to
change at any time, there would be significant inequities, with landowners in some
jurisdictions receiving credits for easements that provide far fewer protections and
public benefit over the long term than landowners in other jurisdictions.
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and the following fifteen years.360 Farmers and ranchers can potentially avoid
paying income tax for up to sixteen years. No other form of charitable gift is
treated as favorably under the Code.
Given the extent of the abuses in the easement donation context and
the generosity of the enhanced incentives, it seems a fair trade to extend the
period within which the IRS could challenge the claimed deductions from the
current three years to six years.361 Doubling the window of vulnerability
would make playing the audit lottery a less attractive option for those engaged
in abusive transactions.362 Doubling the window of vulnerability would also
encourage well-intentioned donors to obtain well-supported appraisals and to
strictly comply with the requirements of § 170(h) and the Regulations. In
addition, while some might argue that doubling the window of vulnerability
would discourage donations, given the generosity of the enhanced incentives,
the chilling effect is likely to be minimal—property owners would still have a
uniquely compelling financial incentive to donate.
2.

Improved Reporting on Form 8283

A conservation easement donor claiming a deduction for an easement
with a value of more than $5,000 (which almost always will be the case) must
substantiate the deduction with a “qualified appraisal” prepared by a “qualified
appraiser,” and must attach a fully completed appraisal summary (the IRS
Form 8283) to the return on which the deduction is first claimed.363 If the
claimed deduction is more than $500,000, the taxpayer must attach the full
qualified appraisal to the return.364 The donor must also attach a “supplemental
statement” to the Form 8283 that (i) identifies the conservation purposes
furthered by the donation, (ii) shows, if the before-and-after valuation method
is used, the fair market value of the subject property before and after the gift,
(iii) states whether the donation was made in order to get a permit or other
approval from a local or other governing authority and whether the donation
360. See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF PPA, supra note 11.
361. Congress recently revised I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1) to provide for a special
six-year statute of limitations with regard to a common component of tax shelter
transactions. See Erin McManus, IRS Gets Six-Year Statute of Limitations for Tax
Shelter Ploy, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Aug. 5, 2015, at G-2.
362. See, e.g., Important Advisory: Syndication, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/important-advisory-syndication (describing abusive
syndicated easement donation transactions).
363. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(C); Reg. § 1.170A–13(c); see also IRS Form
8283, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8283.pdf.
364. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(D).
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was required by a contract (i.e., was there a quid pro quo), and (iv) states
whether the donor or a related person has any interest in other property nearby
and, if so, describes that interest.365
In its current iteration, the Form 8283 is not a particularly effective
reporting tool for conservation or façade easement donations. Some of the
questions on the form are difficult to understand as applied to easement
donations, making the form difficult for donors to complete and the
information provided on the form difficult for the IRS to understand. For
example, in Section B, Part I of the form, subparts 5(c), (d), (e), (f) ask for the
“[a]ppraised fair market value,” “[d]ate acquired by donor,” “[h]ow acquired
by donor,” and “[d]onor’s cost or adjusted basis,” respectively. Most donors
understand that the appraised fair market value should be that of the easement,
but it is not clear if the “date acquired,” “how acquired,” and “basis” questions
relate to the easement or the subject property. It also is not clear whether or
how to address the entire contiguous parcel and enhancement rules.366
The Form 8283 could be revised to instruct the donor, in a
straightforward and easy to understand manner, to provide specific
information relating to the subject property and the easement donation. For
example, it should be clear from the face of the form that the donor of a
conservation or façade easement (i) purchased the underlying property for $1
million in early November 2014, (ii) donated the easement with respect to that
property fourteen months later, in late December 2015, and (iii) is claiming
that the easement (a partial interest in the property) had an appraised fair
market value on the date of the donation of $10 million (that is, that the subject
property appreciated in value by more than 900 percent in just fourteen
months). It also should be clear from the face of the form or the instructions
how the donor should report values determined using the contiguous parcel or
enhancement rules.
In addition, even though overvaluation appears to be a persistent
problem in the easement donation context, the existing Form 8283 does little
to highlight valuation issues. The IRS’s enforcement efforts could be
facilitated by requiring that the donor or the donor’s appraiser provide
additional valuation information in the supplemental statement, such as the
per-acre or per-square-foot value of the conservation or façade easement;
whether a façade easement encumbers a residential or commercial property;
365. See Instructions for IRS Form 8283, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i8283.pdf. For the donation of a façade easement on a building in a registered
historic district, in addition to the Form 8283 and supplemental statement, the taxpayer
must include with the taxpayer’s return for the year of the contribution (a) a qualified
appraisal, (b) photos of the entire exterior of the building, (c) a description of all
restrictions on the development of the building, and (d) if the deduction claimed is
more than $10,000, a $500 filing fee. See I.R.C. §§ 170(h)(4)(B)(iii), 170(f)(13); see
also IRS Form 8283-V, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8283v.pdf.
366. See supra Part II.E.
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whether the subject property is subject to existing restrictions or limitations on
its development and use; whether the appraiser assumed a before-easement
HBU for the subject property that differs from its current use; whether
rezoning was assumed in estimating the before-value of the subject property;
and whether the income capitalization approach, the subdivision development
analysis, the reproduction cost approach, or nonlocal comparables were used
to value the subject property.
Requiring that all easement donors attach the full qualified appraisal
to the return on which the deduction is first claimed would also facilitate IRS
enforcement efforts. Putting appraisers of easements valued at $500,000 or
less on notice that their appraisals will be submitted to the IRS is likely to
make at least some more careful in their analyses.
Lastly, the donee acknowledgment on the current Form 8283 requires
the donee to affirm that “in the event it sells, exchanges, or otherwise disposes
of the property . . . or any portion thereof” within three years of the donation
it will file Form 8282. This acknowledgment suggests that holders are free to
sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of perpetual conservation easements, in
whole or in part, when they are not. The Regulations specify the limited
circumstances in which a tax-deductible easement may be transferred intact to
another eligible donee or extinguished by a court, and the form should be
revised to make this clear.367
Improving reporting on the Form 8283 with respect to easement
donations should be easy to accomplish and cost little to implement. A separate
Form 8283E could be created to report such contributions, or a new section
relating specifically to easements could be added to the existing form. The
instructions could also be revised to require that additional information be
included in the supplemental statement. Such revisions would help donors
comply with the reporting requirements, facilitate IRS review and enforcement
of the § 170(h) deduction, and signal to donors and their appraisers that
valuation will be carefully scrutinized. Such revisions would also enable the
collection of additional data regarding conservation and façade easement
contributions.
3.

Limited-Role Easement Advisory Panel

The creation of an Easement Advisory Panel, somewhat like the Art
Advisory Panel that was created in the late 1960s to assist the IRS in curbing
367. See Reg. § 1.170A–14(c)(2) (restriction on transfer provision); Reg. §
1.170A–14(g)(6) (extinguishment provision); see also Belk, 774 F.3d 221 (taxdeductible easements must be extinguishable only in a judicial proceeding upon a
finding of impossibility or impracticality as provided in the Regulations).

2016]

Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum

299

valuation abuses in the artwork context, should be considered. This is not a
new recommendation, having been made by the author in an article published
eleven years ago.368 For the reasons discussed in that earlier article, however,
it may be preferable for the Easement Advisory Panel to be temporary in
nature, and for its role to be limited to developing a conservation easement
qualified appraisal form and instructions that would guide appraisers through
the easement appraisal process (as described below). Members of the panel
could include IRS appraisers with appropriate expertise; appraisal managers
from Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Forest Service and the Natural
Resource Conservation Service, who have significant experience valuing
conservation easements for federal easement purchase programs; appraisal
managers from state agencies who similarly have significant experience
valuing conservation easements for state easement purchase programs; Tax
Court judges with a particular interest in easement valuation; and others with
relevant expertise and independence from taxpayer clients.
4.

Conservation Easement Qualified Appraisal Form and
Instructions (“Green Book”)

At present, appraisers of conservation and façade easements are
required to comply with numerous requirements contained in various sections
of the Code, the Regulations, and other IRS guidance documents, as well as
generally accepted appraisal standards.369 They also must be familiar with the
growing body of easement valuation case law.370 To help educate appraisers
regarding the requirements in this highly specialized context, the Treasury,
with the help of the Easement Advisory Panel or other individuals with
appropriate expertise, could develop a conservation easement qualified
appraisal form and accompanying instructions for a § 170(h) deduction
appraisal. The form and instructions could consolidate the requirements and
other guidance in one publication, specify the various issues that should be
addressed in the appraisal and the order in which they should be addressed,
368. See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for
Conservation Easement Donations–A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOL. L. Q. 1, 87–
91 (2004).
369. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(11), 170(h); Reg. §§ 1.170A–13(c), 1.170A–
14(h)(3); Notice 2006-96, 2006 I.R.B. 46 (transitional guidance relating to the
definitions of “qualified appraisal” and “qualified appraiser” in IRC § 170(f)(11));
C.C.A. 200738013 (Aug. 9, 2007) (addressing valuation of façade easements); C.C.A.
201334039 (July 25, 2013) (addressing contiguous parcel and enhancement rules);
IRS Form 8283 & Instructions; IRS Publication 561, Determining the Value of
Donated Property; IRS Publication 526, Charitable Contributions.
370. See infra app. A and C (listing the forty-five valuation cases through
2015).
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and provide warnings about common methods of abuse.371 The Uniform
Appraisal Standards for Federal Land Acquisitions (generally referred to as
the “Yellow Book”) could serve as a model for the creation of the form and
instructions.372
A conservation easement qualified appraisal form with instructions
(perhaps referred to as the “Green Book”) would have a variety of important
benefits. It would guide appraisers through the appraisal process in this highly
specialized context, thereby reducing errors and ensuring a level of
consistency that is unseen today. It would perform an important signaling
function for taxpayers and appraisers inclined to overvalue easements. And it
would assist the IRS and the courts in reviewing easement appraisals and
assessing the credibility of the appraisers and the assumptions and
methodologies they employ.
5.

Automatic Review of Certain Appraisals

Automatic (rather than audit lottery) IRS review of certain appraisals
could be required. Automatic review could be mandated with respect to, for
example (i) appraisals that use nonlocal comparables, assume rezoning, or use
the income capitalization, subdivision development, or reproduction cost
approach as the primary method of valuation, (ii) appraisals asserting values
for easements over a threshold dollar amount or a threshold per-acre or persquare foot amount, or (iii) appraisals asserting a value for an easement that is
more than 50 percent of the before-value of the subject property. The triggers
for automatic review could be included as reportable items in the revisions to
the Form 8283 suggested above. To help defray the cost of the reviews, a filing
fee similar to that currently charged with regard to certain façade easement
donations could be required.373
371. The form and instructions could also mandate that the appraiser sign a
declaration at the end of the appraisal stating that the before and after value estimates
reflect the price at which the donor realistically could sell the property in its current
before- and after-easement condition in the open market. This most basic of principles
is often lost in a flood of data, statistics, and assumptions, particularly when an
appraiser relies on the income capitalization, subdivision development, or
reproduction cost approach. Requiring appraisers to sign this declaration may help to
remind them of the basic goal of the appraisal and discourage abusive overvaluations.
372. See ILAC, YELLOW BOOK, supra note 52, Parts I through VII; see also
USDA, Natural Resource Conservation Service, Implementation of Agricultural
Conservation Easement Program, Attachment 9: ACEP-ALE Appraisal and Appraisal
Review Specifications, http://directives.sc.egov.usda.gov/ViewerFS.aspx?hid=
35548. The form and instructions could be produced in electronic form so they can be
easily updated to reflect new case law and other developments.
373. See supra note 365.
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Awareness of the automatic review triggers may make taxpayers and
their appraisers more cautious about aggressive valuations and the use of
valuation methodologies that are particularly susceptible to manipulation and
abuse. If this reform were implemented, however, some easement donors and
appraisers might seek to avoid the automatic review by avoiding the triggers,
while nonetheless overvaluing the easements, by, for example, asserting
unrealistic before-easement HBUs for the subject properties, using local but
noncomparable “comparable” sales, making improper adjustments to
comparable sales, or estimating values that fall just below the trigger amounts.
Accordingly, if this reform were adopted, the existing process of reviewing
returns involving easement donations and selecting some for audit should
continue with regard to those returns that do not trigger automatic review.
6.

More Effective Pre-Trial Process for Resolving Valuation
Disputes

The courts, particularly the Tax Court, have had to devote
considerable judicial resources to resolving easement valuation disputes. In
several of the early easement valuation cases the Tax Court expressed its view
that such cases should be disposed of by way of settlement or other procedures
short of court proceedings. For example, in Losch v Commissioner, the court
stated:
At this point we feel constrained to reiterate once again our
doubts as to the efficacy of using the judicial process to
resolve valuation issues. . . . Litigation is an inefficient,
wasteful, and inherently imprecise method of resolving these
disputes. . . . Additionally, we believe that resolution of these
issues by settlement or other procedures short of court
proceedings will more often result in a value which is fairer
to both parties. The parties and their experts will generally
have a fuller knowledge of the pertinent facts and greater
expertise than does this Court which must rely only on ‘a cold
record and dry briefs’ to form the basis of its conclusion.374
374. Losch, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 88,230; see also
Symington, 87 T.C. at 904 (“Too often in valuation disputes the parties have convinced
themselves of the unalterable correctness of their positions and have consequently
failed successfully to conclude settlement negotiations—a process clearly more
conducive to the proper disposition of disputes such as this.”); Fannon v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1113, 1118 T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 86,572 at n.18 (1986)
(voicing concern over the time and resources spent by the court in resolving valuation
disputes and repeating its admonition that such cases should be disposed of short of
court proceedings; when valuation experts are too ‘result oriented’ it “places the Court
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Although the Tax Court judges seem now to be somewhat resigned to
having to resolve valuation disputes, problems associated with using litigation
to resolve these disputes persist.375 Modification of the current appeals process
or mandating or offering the option of nonbinding pre-trial mediation
involving the IRS, the donor, and an independent mediator with easement
appraisal expertise (or assisted by an independent appraiser with easement
appraisal expertise) should be considered.376 A pre-trial process in which a
significant percentage of valuation disputes are resolved could both relieve the
burden on the courts and result in values that are closer to the actual value of
the easements.
7.

Increased Appraiser Penalties

It is not clear that the penalty provisions that apply to taxpayers deter
overvaluations in the easement donation context. Many easement donors are
one-time participants in such transactions and may be unaware of the penalty
provisions. In addition, if they are aware of the penalty provisions, they also
may be aware that the substantial valuation misstatement penalty is subject to
the reasonable cause exception and, in virtually all cases, taxpayers qualify for
that exception.377 Moreover, even though the gross valuation misstatement
penalty is now a strict liability penalty, the valuation of easements is complex
and a range of values generally will be defendable. Accordingly, many
in the unenviable position of applying its judgment in an area where it has no particular
expertise”).
375. See, e.g., Zarlengo, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 155, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2014161, at 1152 (each of the parties’ experts made adjustments designed to support his
side’s litigating position; “[e]xperts lose their usefulness and credibility when they
merely become advocates for the position argued by a party”); Crimi v. Commissioner,
105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1330, 2015 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2015-051, at 333 (providing that the
court’s concerns about the helpfulness of expert testimony led it to have the experts
testify concurrently, which enabled the court “to more easily separate the reliable
portions of the expert reports from the unreliable”).
376. The proposed nonbinding pre-trial mediation would differ from the
current IRS appeals mediation program in that the mediator would be independent,
rather than an IRS employee, and would have easement appraisal expertise or be
assisted by an independent appraiser with easement appraisal expertise. See Rev. Proc.
2014–63, 2014–52 IRB (describing the IRS appeals mediation program and noting
that “An Appeals employee trained as a mediator will serve as the mediator”).
377. See supra Parts IV.E, V.E and app. A and C; see also David M.
Wooldridge et al., Navigating the Defenses to Valuation Penalties in Charitable
Deduction Cases, 121 J. TAX. 255 (2014) (advising easement donors regarding how
to qualify for the reasonable cause exception).
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easement donors may be unable to competently assess whether an appraisal
overstates the value of an easement, which calls into question the deterrent
effect of even a strict liability penalty.
Given that appraisers are repeat players, are aware of the penalties,
and should have the necessary valuation expertise, increasing the penalties that
apply to them is likely to be a more effective deterrent to overvaluations.378
Moreover, the Tax Court has noted with exasperation “the cottage industry of
[valuation] experts who function primarily in the market for tax benefits” and
that such experts should be “discouraged.”379 The court explained that “[t]he
problem is created by [the experts’] willingness to use their resumes and their
skills to advocate the position of the party who employs them without regard
to objective and relevant facts, contrary to their professional obligations.”380
The existence of this cottage industry is evidenced by the numerous
cases involving appraisers who were willing to assert unreasonable or
unsupported values for easements on behalf of their taxpayer clients.381 It also
378. Appraisers are required to sign a declaration on the Form 8283 in which
they specifically acknowledge that they may be subject to penalties. They also are
required to satisfy certain educational requirements and are likely to learn of the
penalty provisions as part of that education.
379. Boltar, 136 T.C. at 335 (granting the IRS’s motion in limine to exclude
from evidence the report and testimony of the taxpayer’s valuation expert as “so far
beyond the realm of usefulness that admission is inappropriate and exclusion serves
salutary purposes”).
380. Id. at 335.
381. See, e.g., id.; Butler, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1385, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2012-072, at 552 (“we have frequently concluded that appraisals submitted with
taxpayers’ returns overstated the values of claimed deductions even when those reports
were prepared long before the commencement of litigation”); Esgar I, 103 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1185, 1189, 2012 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2012-035, at 272 (appraiser who prepared
the appraisal report used to substantiate deductions for three conservation easement
donations asserted values determined to be more than eleven, sixteen, and seventeen
times the correct values; Colorado later suspended his appraisal license “‘FOR
OVERVALUING conservation easements’”) (emphasis in original); Scheidelman v.
Commissioner, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2013-018 at 171, aff’d
Scheidelman, 755 F.3d at 148 (taxpayer’s valuation expert ignored studies suggesting
a contrary result and adopted those supporting his client's desired value; his testimony
had all of the earmarks of overzealous advocacy in support of the donee land trust’s
marketing program and, indirectly, the taxpayer’s tax reporting); Whitehouse Hotel,
755 F.3d 236 (finding “rather remarkable” the taxpayer’s valuation expert’s assertion
that the Maison Blanche building had a value of $96 million less than three years after
the taxpayer had purchased it for $8.9 million); Dunlap v. Commissioner, 2012 T.C.M.
(RIA) ¶ 2012-126 at 1004 (declining to give the reports of the taxpayers’ valuation
experts any probative weight because their conclusions lacked credibility); Evans, 100
T.C.M. (CCH) 275, 279, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-207 at 1276 (same); Chandler ,
142 T.C. at 289 (same).
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is the result of the current incentive structure. Taxpayers want high values for
the easements they donate because it increases the tax benefits they receive.
Donee organizations benefit from high values because property owners are
more likely to donate if their easements are determined to have high values
and the donees may receive significant stewardship endowments as a result of
the donations.382 Donees thus have an incentive to recommend to prospective
donors appraisers who are willing to assert aggressive values. Appraisers also
have an incentive to assert high values to please their taxpayer clients (who
pay their fees), to receive referrals from those clients, and to remain on the list
of appraisers that donee organizations recommend to prospective donors.383
Confidential conversations with land trust personnel, attorneys, and appraisers
lead this author to believe that appraisers who consider it a point of
professional pride to write only fully-supported easement appraisals currently
lose business to appraisers willing to assert abusive values and to charge less
to do so.
Given that the incentives for taxpayers, donees, and appraisers
generally align toward aggressive valuations and the risk of audit is low, the
current modest monetary penalties to which appraisers are subject are unlikely
to deter overvaluations.384 In addition, although the government can blacklist
appraisers and file suits to enjoin them from aiding and abetting the
understatement of tax liability, those sanctions appear to be invoked only in
the most egregious cases.385 Moreover, even if invoked more frequently, those
sanctions might not be much of a deterrent given that tax appraisals are
generally only one aspect of an appraisal business.
Imposing more significant monetary penalties on appraisers who
prepare easement appraisals that result in substantial or gross valuation
misstatements could alter the current incentive structure. The threat of such
penalties (or having to litigate about the appropriateness of such penalties)
might help persuade appraisers to prepare only well-supported easement
appraisals. It might also discourage appraisers without significant easement
valuation expertise from accepting such assignments. And a decrease in the
382. See, e.g., Kiva Dunes, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1818, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2009-145, at 1177 (taxpayer donated $35,000 along with a conservation easement the
taxpayer valued at $30.5 million to the North American Land Trust).
383. See, e.g., Kaufman I, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1262, 2014 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2014-052 at 384–85 (stating that ‘“the appraiser, who admitted receiving fees for a
succession of such appraisals for [donee] easements, assuredly had an interest in
remaining on the list of those recommended by the [donee] to potential donors”’).
384. See supra Part III.B. (explaining that an appraiser may be subject to a
penalty of $1,000 for knowingly aiding and abetting an understatement of tax liability,
and a penalty equal to no more than 125 percent of the fee for the preparation of an
appraisal that results in a substantial or gross valuation misstatement).
385. See supra Part III.B; see also supra Part IV.E.
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number of appraisers willing to take on easement appraisal assignments might
enable the remaining appraisers, who would have a highly specialized skill set,
to charge fees commensurate with the complexity of the assignments.
8.

Standardized Safe Harbor Provisions

Although federally-deductible conservation and façade easements
obviously could not be standardized in full, certain of their terms generally
should not vary from easement to easement. For example, the Regulations
specify the limited circumstances under which tax-deductible easements can
be transferred or extinguished, the minimum proceeds that must be payable to
the holder upon extinguishment, and the manner in which the holder must use
such proceeds.386 These requirements are designed to ensure that taxdeductible easements are (i) transferred only to governmental or charitable
entities that will continue to enforce the easements on behalf of the public and
(ii) extinguished only in a judicial proceeding, upon a finding that continuing
to use the subject property for conservation or historic preservation purposes
has become impossible or impractical, and with a payment of a share of
proceeds to the holder to be used to replace lost conservation or historic values
(thereby protecting the federal investment).387
Taxpayers currently draft easements that address these “perpetuity”
requirements in countless different ways, and sometimes in ways purposefully
designed to circumvent the requirements.388 This variability makes an already
complex valuation assignment more complex. Moreover, appraisers generally
assume that a conservation or facade easement that states that it is “perpetual”
will, in fact, be perpetual. The result is that some (perhaps not insignificant
percentage of) easements that do not satisfy the perpetuity requirements slip
through the current system and are valued—and subsidized by federal
taxpayers—as if they were perpetual when they are not. Use of standardized
386. See Reg. §§ 1.170A–14(c)(2) (restriction on transfer requirement); Reg.
1.170A–14(g)(6) (judicial extinguishment, division of proceeds, and use of proceeds
requirements); see also Belk, 774 F.3d 221 (tax-deductible easements must be
extinguishable only in a judicial proceeding and upon a finding of impossibility or
impracticality as provided in the Regulations).
387. Id.
388. See, e.g., Carpenter, 106 T.C.M. (CCH) at 62, 2013 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶
2013-172, at 1393 (donated conservation easements provided that they could be
extinguished by judicial proceeding or by mutual agreement of the parties); Belk v.
Commissioner, 774 F.3d 221 (4th Cir. 2014) (donated conservation easement provided
that the landowner and the holder could agree to extinguish the easement with regard
to portions of the protected land in exchange for protecting other land). In both cases
the deductions were disallowed for failure to satisfy the extinguishment requirements
in the Regulations.
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safe harbor provisions would help to ensure that easements valued and
subsidized as if they satisfy the perpetuity requirements actually satisfy those
requirements.389
VII.

CONCLUSION

Overvaluation has been a persistent problem in the conservation and
façade easement donation context. It results, in part, from the lack of a market
for such easements, the complexity associated with indirect valuation, and the
fact that all parties (the donor, the donee, and the appraiser) have an incentive
to assert high values. But this problem is not insurmountable. As the foregoing
discussion indicates, a variety of reforms could be implemented to help reduce
valuation abuse.
Overvaluation, however, is only part of the problem. Ensuring that
conservation and façade easements are accurately valued at the time of their
donation would not guarantee that the public’s money is being well spent.
Additional reforms are needed to ensure that the easements protect properties
that have important conservation or historic values, and that those protections
will not be lost through, for example, lack of enforcement or the substantial
modification, release, or termination of the easements. Accordingly, any
reforms in the easement deduction context should also include measures
designed to ensure both the quality and the durability of the easements.

389. As in the charitable lead and charitable remainder trust context, safe
harbor or “sample” conservation easement provisions that meet the requirements of §
170(h) and the Regulations and generally should not vary from easement to easement
could be developed and published in a Revenue Procedure. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2005–
52, 2005 I.R.B. 34 (providing sample provisions that meet the requirements for an
inter vivos charitable remainder unitrust and annotations explaining the provisions).
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1. The cases are listed in order of the date of the first donation (some cases involved more than one donation).
2. This column lists the façade easement (FE) values the taxpayers asserted on their income tax returns.
3. This column lists the court-determined values for the façade easements.
4. These percentages represent the easement value asserted by a taxpayer on a return divided by the value determined by the court to be the correct
value, multiplied by 100. For the recent cases, these percentages are used to determine whether a taxpayer made a substantial or gross valuation misstatement for
penalty purposes. For example, in Whitehouse, the taxpayer asserted that the easement had a value of $7,445,000, the court determined that the correct value was
$1,857,716, and the taxpayer thus asserted a value for the easement that was just over 4 times (or 401 percent of) the correct value (i.e., $7,445,000/$1,857,716 x
100 = 400.7). Under both pre- and post-PPA law, this would constitute a gross valuation misstatement.
5. This column indicates whether the taxpayers were found liable for penalties due to overstatement of the value of the easements. The initials rc
mean r as na
aus an sl
ans str t a t
6. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
7. Taxpayers were found liable for the increased rate of interest imposed on substantial underpayments attributable to tax motivated transactions
under I.R.C. § 6621(c).
8. Taxpayers were found liable for the increased rate of interest imposed on substantial underpayments attributable to tax motivated transactions
under I.R.C. § 6621(c).
9. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
10. Taxpayers, who had no particular expertise in the area of facade easement valuation and relied on their appraiser, were found not to be negligent
and therefore not liable for an addition to tax under I.R.C. § 6653(a). Also, the court incorrectly determined that the value the taxpayers claimed for the easement
($245,000) was not 150 percent r
r f at t
urt stat
as t
as
nt’s rr t a u
an t us t at t r as n a uat n
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12. Taxpayer was found not liable for the gross valuation misstatement penalty because it qualified for the reasonable cause exception.
13. If the correct value of the easement is determined to be zero, the value claimed by the taxpayer on the return is considered to be 400 percent or
more of the correct value and, thus, there is a gross valuation misstatement. See Reg. § 1.6662 5(g).
14. The taxpayers were found not liable for the gross valuation misstatement penalty because they qualified for the reasonable cause exception.
15. The taxpayers were found liable for gross valuation misstatement penalties because they did not qualify for the reasonable cause exception.
16. Tax Court summary opinions may not be treated as precedent for any other case. See I.R.C. § 7463(b).
17. Taxpayers conceded liability for an I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) addition to tax (for failure to file a return or pay tax) as appropriate. That penalty was not
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n n
18. The parties agreed that additions to tax under I.R.C. §6651(a)(1) and (2) (for failure to file a return or pay tax) and I.R.C. § 6654 (for failure to pay
estimated income tax) were applicable to any resulting deficiency because the taxpayer failed to timely file returns for the years at issue. Those penalties were not
as
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nt
t r na t s r a r ss n t
n n
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19. Taxpayers donated two façade easements and claimed this amount on their tax return with regard to the donations.
20. The taxpayers were found not liable for a valuation misstatement penalty because they qualified for the reasonable cause exception.
21. The taxpayers were found not liable for a valuation misstatement penalty because they qualified for the reasonable cause exception.
22. The parties agreed at trial that value of easement was zero.
23. The parties agreed that the taxpayers made gross valuation misstatements on their 2004, 2005, and 2006 returns attributable to the overvaluation of
the façade easement. The parties also agreed that the taxpayers were not liable for penalties with regard to the overstatements on their 2004 and 2005 returns
because they qualified for the reasonable cause exception.
24. The taxpayers were found liable for the strict liability gross valuation misstatement penalty with regard to their 2006 return.
25. The taxpayers were found not liable for gross valuation misstatement penalties with regard to their 2004 and 2005 returns because they qualified
for the reasonable cause exception.
26. The taxpayers were found liable for the strict liability gross valuation misstatement penalty with regard to their 2006 return.
27. The taxpayers were found not liable for valuation misstatement penalties with regard to their 2004 and 2005 returns because they qualified for the
reasonable cause exception.
28. One of the taxpayers was found liable for the strict liability gross valuation misstatement penalties with regard to her 2006 and 2007 returns
(provided the applicable dollar limitation set forth in I.R.C. § 6662(e)(2) were satisfied).
29. The taxpayers were found liable for the strict liability gross valuation misstatement penalties for their 2006 and 2007 returns.
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1. The early and recent cases, respectively, are listed in order of the percentage by which the façade easement decreased the value of the subject
property, from the lowest to the highest percentage.
2. This column lists the court-determined value of the subject property before the easement donation.
3. This column lists the court-determined value of the subject property after the easement donation. In some cases (where the court did not do the
computation) this value was computed by subtracting the court-determined easement value from the court-determined before-value.
4. This column lists the court-determined value for the façade easement.
5. This column lists the percentage by which the easement reduced the before-value of the subject property, assuming the court-determined values.
6. At the time of the donation there were ten apartment units in the building, which were later converted into nine condominium units and 674 square
feet of open space. The donor of the easement was a partnership, the purpose of which was to acquire, rehabilitate, hold for investment, and operate the building
as an apartment building.
7. Vieux Carre is the old name for the French Quarter in New Orleans. It means “Old Square” in French.
8. The Vieux Carre Commission is a government agency responsible for the historic preservation of the French Quarter in New Orleans.
9. The property consisted of three lots. At the time of the donation an office building was located on one of the lots, the adjacent lot was used as a
parking lot, and the rear lot was vacant.
10. The property consisted of a semi-detached three-story and full basement townhouse that was restored by the taxpayers and used as a law office.
11. At the time of the donation the property was zoned for mixed residential and commercial use.
12. The taxpayers renovated the property (a three-story building) into office-space.
13. At the time of the donation the building was available for “office/commercial use.”
14. The Cobblestone Loft Condominium is a seven-story loft building made up of thirty-one residential units and one unit owned by Cobblestone for
use by the superintendent. All taxpayers owned units within Cobblestone.
15. Tax Court Summary Opinions may not be treated as precedent for any other case. See I.R.C. § 7463(b).
16. The residences were subject to the Historic Landmark and Historic Preservation Act of 1978.
17. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction equal to 5 percent of the $1,250,000 before-easement value of the first property,
but miscalculated the amount of that deduction (5 percent of $1,250,000 is $62,500, not $56,250).
18. The Whitehouse Hotel partnership purchased the property—the Maison Blanche building—to rehabilitate it for use as a Ritz-Carlton Hotel.
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Appendix C: Conservation Easements
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137%

Calhoun & Early
Counties,
GA

Georgia Land Trust48

$
$

2,550,000
2,936,000

$ 1,637,600
$ 2,312,800

$
$

156%
127%

Prowers County,
CO
Lake County, CA

Greenlands Reserve

$
$
$
$

570,500
867,500
836,500
4,691,500

$
$
$
$

$
520,726
$
817,998
$
786,726
$ 4,691,500

$

7,398,333

$ 7,350,00053

$

48,333

101%

No54

$ 23,940,000

$19,955,014

$ 3,984,986

120%

No/rc/bt55

$

$

$ 1,338,500

1773%

$ 24,311,529
$ 1,519,471

-1002%

38443
2003
2003
2003
2003

Butler, T.C. Memo.
2012-72

Acres
2,41337

2003
2004

40
393
1346
1,780
2,45047

Esgar Corp. et al.,
744 F.3d 648 (10th
Cir. 2014)
Mountanos, T.C.
Memo. 2014-38
SWF Real Estate,
T.C. Memo. 2015-63

2004
2004
2004
2005

54
54
54
882

2005

675

Palmer Ranch, T.C.
Memo. 2014-79
Legg, 145 T.C. No.
13 (2015)
Total:
Average:

2006

82

2007

80

Gunnison County,
CO
El Paso County,
CO
Muscogee County,
GA

Albemarle County,
VA
Sarasota County,
FL
CO56

Donee
Valley Land
Conservancy
North American
Land Trust
Shirley Heinze
Land Trust
Crested Butte
Land Trust

Golden State Land
Conservancy
Albemarle County
Public Rec. Facilities
Authority
Sarasota County
Colorado Natural
Land Trust

1,418,500

49,774
49,503
49,774
0

80,00057

912,400
623,200

1146%
1752%
1681%
400%51

No/rc/bt49

No/rc50
Yes/sl52

Yes/sl58
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1. The early and recent cases are listed in order of the date of the first donation (some cases involved more than one donation).
2. This column lists the conservation easement (CE) values the taxpayers asserted on their income tax returns.
3. This column lists the court-determined correct values for the conservation easements.
4. These percentages represent the easement value asserted by a taxpayer on a return divided by the value determined by the court to be the correct
value, multiplied by 100. For the recent cases, these percentages are used to determine whether a taxpayer made a substantial or gross valuation misstatement for

penalty purposes. For example, in Trout Ranch, the taxpayer asserted that the easement had a value of $2,179,849, the court determined that the correct value was
$560,000, and the taxpayer thus asserted a value for the easement that was almost 4 times (or 389 percent of) the correct value (i.e., $2,179,849/$560,000 x 100 =
389). Under pre-PPA law this constituted a substantial valuation overstatement. Under post-PPA law it would be a gross valuation misstatement.
5. This column indicates whether the taxpayers were found liable for penalties due to the overstatement of the value of the easements. The initials
nt re rted y the taxpayers fell below the threshold for
r indi ate that the ta ayers a i ied r the reas na e a se e e ti n t indi ates that the a
the ena ty s indi ates that the penalty imposed was the post-PPA strict liability gross valuation misstatement penalty.
6. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
7. The easement encumbered 668 of the 2,100 acres owned by the taxpayer.
8. The Stanley Works easement had a 30.5-year term. For a brief period, the deduction for the donation of an easement was available with regard to
easements having a minimum term of at least 30 years. See RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.04[2].
9. The taxpayer was found liable for the increased interest rate on substantial underpayments attributable to tax motivated transactions under I.R.C. §
6621(d) (1954).
10. The Akers easement had a term of 30 years and approximately 1 month. See supra note 8.
11. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
12. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
his as the a e asserted y the ta ayers’ e ert at tria t is n t ear i this is the value asserted by the taxpayers on their income tax return.
13.
14. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
15. The taxpayers asserted a value for the easement that was determined to be exactly (or 100 percent of) the value determined by the court to be the
correct value. Accordingly, the taxpayers did not overstate the value of the easement.
16. Penalties were asserted but not imposed because the court determined the easement was not overvalued.
17. The 4th Circuit opinion, which increased the value of the easement by $100 per acre, was unpublished.
18. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
19. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
20. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
21. The easement encumbered 107 of the 407 acres owned by the taxpayers.
22. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
23. The taxpayers were not liable for the I.R.C. § 6659 addition to tax for valuation overstatements or the I.R.C. § 6621(c) increase in interest for
underpayments attributable to a tax motivated transaction because the value of the easement the taxpayers claimed on their return was not 150 percent or more of
the correct value.
24. In Shapiro, the court determined that the taxpayers had understated the value of the easements. For example, the taxpayers asserted a value of
$344,250 with regard to the 165-acre parcel, the court determined the correct value was $375,000, and the taxpayer thus asserted a value for the easement that
was slightly less than (or only 92 percent of) the correct value (i.e., $344,250/$375,000 x 100 = 91.8).
25. The parties stipulated that, for purposes of the penalty provisions, there were no valuation overstatements and the transactions were not tax
motivated.
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26. The taxpayers were not liable for the I.R.C. § 6659 addition to tax for valuation overstatements or the I.R.C. § 6621(c) increase in interest for
underpayments attributable to a tax motivated transaction because the value of the easement the taxpayers claimed on their return was not 150 percent or more of
the correct value.
27. The Schwabs purchased certain rights in the 1,558-acre tract, including the right to prevent development as well as hunting and fishing rights. The
Schwabs then donated the right to prevent development to the American Farmland Trust.
28. The IRS asserted penalties in its notice of deficiency but the court did not address them in its opinion. The IRS may have conceded the issue.
29. Because the court held for the taxpayers, it did not address whether they were liable for penalties.
,
r the ease ent i e , they n eyed it in a ar ain sa e transa ti n hey ai ed a ded ti n
30. The taxpayers in Browning ere aid
of $289,500.
31. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
32. The taxpayer amended her easement in 1994 to relinquish one of the two rights she retained in the easement to build additional residences on the
property. This was treated as an additional donation under I.R.C. § 170(h).
he ta ayer’s ded ti n as i ited t her
,
asis in the ease ent e a se she d nated the easement less than one year after purchasing
33.
the property. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A). The court determined that the fair market value of the easement was $839,680.
34. This is the amount by which the taxpayer overstated her deduction (the excess of $1,080,000 over $800,000, or $280,000).
35. The taxpayer was not liable for the I.R.C. § 6662 penalty because the values for the easement and amendment that she reported on her return did
not meet the penalty thresholds.
36. The total of the overstatements was divided by 18 the number of easements. The easement and amendment in Strasburg were treated as one
easement.
37. The property consisted of two parcels.
38. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
39. The taxpayer was not liable for the I.R.C. § 6662 accuracy-related penalty because the value for the easement it reported on its return was below
the penalty thresholds.
40. The easement encumbered 8 of the 20 acres owned by the taxpayer.
41. IRS did not assert penalties in a timely fashion.
42. The 10th Circuit opinion was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter and is not binding precedent but it may be cited for its persuasive
value.
43. The easement encumbered 384 of the 453 acres owned by the taxpayer.
44. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
45. The taxpayer was not liable for a penalty due to a substantial understatement of income tax because the taxpayer qualified for the reasonable cause
exception. The taxpayer was found not liable for a substantial valuation misstatement penalty because the amount the taxpayer claimed on his return with regard
to the easement was below the penalty threshold.
46. Two easements were placed on properties owned by the taxpayers across the road from one another, with one of the easements excluding 24.5
acres s rr ndin the ta ayers’ h e
47. The two easements excluded 1,370 acres of the subject plantation.
48. The Georgia Land Trust was formerly known as the Chattowah Open Land Trust.
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49. The taxpayers were found not liable for a penalty due to a substantial understatement of income tax because the taxpayers qualified for the
reasonable cause exception. The taxpayers were found not liable for valuation misstatement penalties because the amounts they claimed on their returns with
regard to the easements were below the penalty thresholds.
50. Two of the three taxpayers were found not liable for a penalty due to a substantial understatement of income tax or a valuation misstatement
because they qualified for the reasonable cause exception. The IRS conceded that one of the taxpayers was not liable for the accuracy-related penalty for the
2005 and 2006 tax years, and that taxpayer conceded it was liable for an I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) addition to tax (for failure to file a return or pay tax). The latter
penalty was not ased n the ta ayers’ a ati n erstate ent
51. If the correct value of the easement is determined to be zero, the value claimed by the taxpayer on the return is considered to be 400 percent or
more of the correct amount and, thus, there is a gross valuation misstatement. See Reg. § 1.6662 5(g).
52. The taxpayer was found liable for the strict liability gross valuation misstatement penalty with regard to his 2006, 07, and 08 returns.
53. This reflects a reduction in the court-determined value of the easement to account for $70,000 of enhancement in the val e the ta ayer’s near y
property as a result of the easement.
54. Penalties were not addressed in the opinion.
55. The taxpayer was found not liable for a gross valuation misstatement because the amount claimed on its return with regard to the easement was
below the penalty threshold. The taxpayer was found not liable for an accuracy-related penalty for an underpayment of tax attributable to negligence or disregard
of rules or regulations, a substantial understatement of income tax, or a substantial valuation misstatement because it qualified for the reasonable cause exception.
56. The opinion does not indicate the county in which the subject land is located.
57. The parties stipulated that value of the easement was $80,000.
58. The taxpayers were found liable for the strict liability gross valuation misstatement penalty with regard to their 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010
returns.

316

Schwab, T.C. Memo.
1994-232

Early Cases1
Todd, 617 F.Supp.
253 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
Akers, 799 F.2d 243
(6th Cir. 1986)
Fannon, T.C. Memo.
1989-136
Symington, 87 T.C.
892 (1986)
Thayer, T.C. Memo.
1977-370
Clemens et al., T.C.
Memo. 1992-436
Fannon, 842 F.2d
1290 (4th Cir. 1988)16
Dennis, 1992 WL
330398 (E.D.Va)
Strasburg, T.C.
Memo. 2000-94
Higgins, T.C. Memo.
1990-103
Johnston et al., T.C.
Memo. 1997-475
Stanley Works, 87
T.C. 389 (1986)
Browning, 109 T.C.
303 (1997)
Stotler et al., T.C.
Memo. 1987-275
McLennan, 994 F.2d
839 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
Schapiro, T.C.
Memo. 1991-128

Property
Location
Westmoreland
County, PA
Cheatham
County, TN
Rappahannock
County, VA
Middleburg,
VA
Fairfax
County, VA
Martha’s
Vineyard, MA
Rappahannock
County, VA
Rappahannock
County, VA
Sweet Grass
County, MT
Talbot County,
MD
Sheridan
County, WY
Litchfield,
CT
Howard
County, MD
Monterey
County, CA
Westmoreland
County, PA
Baltimore &
Harford
Counties, MD
Glen County,
CA
30-lot residential
development
---17

308

1,558

165
30

17029

1,584

52

66824

4,898

23

320

farming & duck hunting
club

low density residential
subdivision27
country estate &
12-13 residential lots
10 residential lots

35+-acre lots; recreation
& agriculture
hydroelectric power
plant
15 residential lots

5 40-acre parcels or 10
parcels with approval18
4 residential lots

40-lot subdivision

140

83

3-5 luxury homesites

HBU
Before2
country estate
(1 homesite)
multiple secluded
recreational retreats12
28-lot residential
development
4-6 homesites

60

61

142

1,343

Acres
104

342,500

294,370

213,000

694,000

120,500

337,556

235,000

---

hunting and fishing36

-----

675,000
$ 1,165,000

$

$ 6,650,000

$ 2,057,160

$

$ 2,624,000

$

$

$ 2,025,000

$

$

$

$

BeforeValue4
$ 875,000

scenic & habitat
(1 stone cabin)28
country estate &
8 residential lots30
agriculture &
1 residential lot33

farm with 1 residence

recreation & limited
agriculture 23
farmland

agriculture &
6 residential lots
agriculture &
3 residential lots
2 parcels,
2 residences19
1 residential lot

HBU
After3
country estate
(1 homesite)9
6 secluded
recreational retreats13
agriculture & 3
residential lots
country estate
(1 homesite)14
country estate
(1 homesite)15
24-lot subdivision

Appendix D: Conservation Easements

229,500

202,000

147,140

580,000

69,890

215,775

925,722

132,000

$

$

---37

---34

---31

100,000

157,000

$ 1,680,000

$

$

$ 1,784,320

$

$

$ 1,322,000

$

$

$

$

AfterValue5
$ 844,000

$ 5,021
$
$

$ 3,530

92,370
113,000

50,610
839,68020
290,00021
103,000

$

$ 703,000
121,781

$

$
$
$
$
$

233,260

$ 544,000

$ 375,000
$ 220,031

$

$ 1,065,000

672

$

349

$ 3,05135

$ 1,372

$

$ 9,962

$

518,00026

231
$ 7,440

$

$ 4,478

610

395

$ 1,514

464

$ 4,970,00025

$ 1,131,438

$ 1,883

65,860

$

$

$

114,000

$

85

Per-Acre
CE Value7
$ 298

Easement
Value6
$
31,00010

---

---

---32

91%

77%

75%

55%

44%

43%22

42%

36%

35%

33%

31%

31%

16%

Reduction
in Value8
4%11

317

El Paso
County, CO
Gunnison
County, CO
Baldwin
County, AL
Sarasota
County, FL
Lake County,
IN
CO

Schmidt, T.C. Memo.
2014-159
Hughes, T.C. Memo.
2009-94
Kiva Dunes, T.C.
Memo. 2009-145
Palmer Ranch, T.C.
Memo. 2014-79
Boltar, 136 T.C. 326
(2011)
Legg, 145 T.C. No.
13 (2015)
370-lot residential
subdivision
360 multifamily units
(required rezoning)
single-family residential development
---60

13-lot subdivision
(required rezoning)
agriculture & recreation

38 low-density
residential estate lots

agriculture

residential
development44

agri- & silviculture,
recreation, & residential
(rural) development43

40-lot residential
subdivision

HBU
Before
recreation

single-family residential development
---

agriculture & recreation; 2 residences54
golf course, park,
agriculture
public recreation

no subdivision, 5
dwellings;
agriculture, forestal
& recreation
1 homesite

---49

12 rural estates

density reduced to 15
200+-acre tracts

21-lot shared
amenities ranch

HBU
After
recreation
---

---

---

$21,005,278

$31,938,985

$ 2,381,350

$ 1,422,445

$10,460,000

$ 4,916,600
$ 279,400
$
73,774
$
76,503
$
73,774

$12,880,000
$11,524,800

$ 4,450,000

BeforeValue
---38

388,975

270,000

---

---58

$ 1,050,264

$ 2,982,981

$

$

$ 3,040,000

$ 2,458,300
$ 140,000
$
24,000
$
27,000
$
24,000

$11,242,400
$ 9,212,000

$ 3,890,000

AfterValue

560,000

92050

6,39846

93445

1,458

$

$

80,000

42,40059

$

$

1,000

5,300

$ 243,354

$ 203,234

$28,656,00456
$19,955,014

$

826

$ 28,811

$ 10,889

$

$

$

$

Per-Acre
CE Value
$
0

$ 1,992,375

$ 1,152,445

$ 7,350,00052

$ 2,458,300
$ 139,400
$
49,774
$
49,503
$
49,774

$ 1,637,600
$ 2,312,800

$

Easement
Value
$
0

---

---

95%

90%

84%55

81%

70%

67%51

50%48

16%47

13%

Reduction
in Value
0%

1. The early and recent cases, respectively, are listed in order of the percentage by which the conservation easement decreased the value of the subject
property, from the lowest to the highest percentage.
2. This column lists the court-determined highest and best use (HBU) of the subject property before the easement donation.
3. This column lists the court-determined HBU of the subject property after the easement donation.
4. This column lists the court-determined value of the subject property before the easement donation.

80

857

82

141

2,41353

40

675

Albemarle
County, VA

Esgar Corp., et al.,
744 F.3d 648 (10th
Cir. 2014)

SWF Real Estate,
T.C. Memo. 2015-63

1,780
2,45041

38440

Acres
882

393
1342
54
54
54

Calhoun &
Early Counties,
GA

Property
Location
Lake County,
CA
Gunnison
County, CO

Muscogee
County, GA
Prowers
County, CO

Butler, T.C. Memo.
2012-72

Recent Cases
Mountanos, T.C.
Memo. 2014-38
Trout Ranch, 493
Fed.Appx. 944 (10th
Cir. 2012) )39
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5. This column lists the court-determined value of the subject property after the easement donation. In some cases (where the court did not do the
computation) this value was computed by subtracting the court-determined easement value from the court-determined before-value.
6. This column lists the court-determined value for the easements.
7. This column lists the per-acre value of the easement, calculated by dividing the court-determined value of the easement by the number of acres the
easement encumbers.
8. This column lists the percentage by which the easement or easements reduced the before-value of the subject property, assuming the courtdetermined values.
th
h th as
t r tt th ra t r a th ra t r’s h rs t s
th r rt
t
ar s th
f the property both
9.
before and after the easement was as a country estate because the surrounding area consisted of estate properties (and few subdivisions) and residents of the area
historically had been opposed to development.
h
rt h that th
’s t r
at
th a
a
t
as rr t
r
t th
at tr a th
’s
rt ass rt a
10.
before-value of $875,000, an after-value of $854,000, and an easement value of $20,800. However, in its notice of deficiency, the IRS had asserted a value for
the easement of $31,000. In entering judgment for the IRS, the court appeared to have accepted $31,000 as the value of the easement. Accordingly, the table lists
a before-value of $875,000, an after-value of $844,000, and an easement value of $31,000.
t a
th ta a r’s s t
that th
t
a
th r r rt as a r s t th s
as
t as a
11. The court found
sta r
r t
12. The property consisted of two parcels, an 82-acre parcel consisting of 31 tracts and a 1,261-acre parcel that could be divided into as many as 24
tracts. However, dividing and selling the separate tracts would entail costs and time and the properties had no access to public water or public sewage and were
appropriate for secluded recreational retreats. The
rt
that th
’s
rt r a
ara sa s
- and 1,400-acre tracts in the area that
could be divided to determine the before-value of the 1,261-acre tract was more appropriate than looking to sales of small lots.
13. The easement permitted construction of only 6 residences on the combined properties.
14. The easement prohibited subdivision and allowed only one single-family residential dwelling and ancillary structures and farm building and
structures. The court noted that Middlebur
r
a s
r ar
as a a th a
r st
ss t
r
a
ta
a
ar
tr
stat s
h
rt a s
t that s t th a
t att t
a a st s
s
th r as a r a
a d for smaller, individual lots in the
Middleburg area at the time of the donation.
h
s r at
as
ta
th
st
a rh s
a ’s tta
ar ta r’s tta a
th r a
ar str t res, but prohibited any
15.
additional residences or subdivision.
16. The 4th Circuit opinion, which increased the value of the easement by $100 per acre, was unpublished.
17. The court did not discuss the HBU of the property before the donation in its short opinion.
18. The county had to approve subdivision of the property into ten parcels.
19. The easement initially permitted subdivision of the property into two parcels and the building of two residences in addition to the existing
str t r s
r’s r s
ar ta r’s r s
st a
a a
h s
a 1994 amendment to the easement, the taxpayer relinquished the
right to build one of the two additional residences.
h ta a r’s
t
as
t t h r
as s th as
t
a s sh
at th as
t ss tha
ar after purchasing
20.
the property. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A). The court determined that the fair market value of the easement was $839,680.
21. This was the value of an amendment to the easement in which the taxpayer gave up the right to build an additional residence on the property.
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22. This
22. isThis
the percentage
is the percentage
by which
by which
the easement
the easement
and the
and
amendment
the amendment
reduced
reduced
the value
the value
of the of
property.
the property.
23. The
The easement
allowed
allowed
the grazing
the grazing
and ranging
and ranging
of horses,
of horses,
cattle,cattle,
and buffalo;
and buffalo;
the continued
the continued
use ofuse
three
of cabins
three cabins
already
already
existing
existing
on theon
property;
the property;
and and
23. easement
the construction
one additional
to exceed
a height
of 20and
feetarea
andofarea
of 1,500
onfloor.
each floor.
The following
activities
were prohibited:
the construction
of oneofadditional
cabin cabin
not to not
exceed
a height
of 20 feet
1,500
squaresquare
feet onfeet
each
The following
activities
were prohibited:
subdivision
and development;
all residential,
commercial,
and industrial
uses;
and mineral
exploration
and extraction;
harvesting;
and
the growing
of
subdivision
and development;
all residential,
commercial,
and industrial
uses; oil
andoilmineral
exploration
and extraction;
timbertimber
harvesting;
and the
growing
of
Livestock
grazing
was limited
75 percent.
In addition,
the easement
gaveNature
The Nature
Conservancy
possessory
such
theto
right
to enter
crops.crops.
Livestock
grazing
was limited
by 75 by
percent.
In addition,
the easement
gave The
Conservancy
severalseveral
possessory
rights,rights,
such as
the as
right
enter
the property,
thrt
rt rs as rs as
th sthe
was
the most
the property,
to c t to
a c rt a r
tat tat
a t a t t r s tr r s r r s hr sta ha tar’sa r’srt hrt thh
sa thsas was
most
restrictive
easement
hadinseen
in than
more13
than
13 appraising
years appraising
easements.
restrictive
easement
he hadheseen
more
years
easements.
24. The
The easement
encumbered
encumbered
668 of668
the of
2,100
the 2,100
acres owned
acres owned
by theby
taxpayer.
the taxpayer.
The taxpayer
The taxpayer
had acquired
had acquired
the property
the property
between
between
1906 and
19061916
and for
1916 for
24. easement
$48,582
with
the intention
of damming
the Housatonic
and constructing
a hydroelectric
The easement
a 30.5-year
term.a brief
For a brief
$48,582
with the
intention
of damming
the Housatonic
River River
and constructing
a hydroelectric
powerpower
plant. plant.
The easement
had a had
30.5-year
term. For
the deduction
the donation
of an easement
was available
with regard
to easements
a minimum
term
of at30
least
30 years.
See R
Richard
P.P.Powell,
period,period,
the deduction
for thefor
donation
of an easement
was available
with regard
to easements
havinghaving
a minimum
term of
at least
years.
See Richard
P. Powell,
ichaRd
Powell,
POWELL
ON
REAL
PROPERTY
§ 34A.04[2].
POWELL
ON o
REAL
PROPERTY
§ 34a.04[2].
34A.04[2].
P
owell
n
Real
PRoPeRty
25. The
The easement
barredbarred
all commercial
all commercial
development
development
and the
and
construction
the construction
of a hydroelectric
of a hydroelectric
powerpower
plant and
plantrequired
and required
preservation
preservation
of the of
property
the property
in
in
25. easement
tr
r ars hars hrt stat rt stat
r affected
arily affected
onlyacres
668 of
acres
the property,
it
ts s ts s at ra ata ra a s a s a t
that that
a th a hthth hasth ast r tarily
only 668
the of
property,
it
affected
the value
the entire
acres because,
the terms
the easement,
[the taxpayer]
was precluded
from constructing
a power
plant
affected
the value
of the of
entire
2,100 2,100
acres because,
under under
the terms
of the of
easement,
[the taxpayer]
was precluded
from constructing
a power
plant on
anyon any
rt th r th rtr rth s thh s ath a th asement
th asement
appears
tobeen
havebased
been based
the difference
between
the beforeand after-values
the entire
rt
appears
to have
on theon
difference
between
the beforeand after-values
of the of
entire
contiguous
2,100-acre
contiguous
2,100-acre
parcel.parcel.
26. The
in Browning
r a r a
r th rasth ast
tth
th
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34. The court did not indicate the before- or after-values of the subject properties in the opinion.
35. This is the total value of the easements divided by the total acres encumbered ($595,031/195 = $3,051).
36. The Schwabs purchased certain rights in the 1,558-acre tract, including the right to prevent development as well as hunting and fishing rights. The
Schwabs then donated the right to prevent development to the American Farmland Trust.
37. The court did not indicate the before- or after-values of the subject property in the opinion.
38. The court did not indicate the before- or after-easement values of the subject property in the opinion.
39. The 10th Circuit opinion was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter and is not binding precedent but it may be cited for its persuasive
value.
40. The easement encumbered 384 of the 453 acres owned by the taxpayer.
41. The two easements excluded 1,370 acres of the subject plantation.
42. Two easements were placed on properties owned by the taxpayers across the road from one another, with one of the easements excluding 24.5
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44. The court concluded that a portion of the larger parcel could be rezoned for density higher than one house per acre. However, there also were lot
size restrictions on portions of the larger parcel and some portions were not suitable for development. The court also noted that neighborhood with regard to both
parcels was becoming attractive to developers, and the taxpayer had received three unsolicited offers from developers who wanted to purchase a small portion of
the larger parcel.
45. This is the total value of the easements divided by the total acres encumbered ($3,950,400/4,230 = $934).
46. This is the total value of the easements divided by the total acres encumbered ($2,597,700/406 = $6,398).
47. This is the percent by which the two easements collectively reduced the value of the property ($24,404,800/$3,950,400 = 16).
48. This is the percent by which the two easements collectively reduced the value of the properties ($5,196,000/$2,597,700 = 50).
49. The court did not specifically address the HBU of the properties after the easement donations. The court did note that the easements grant the
holder the right to preserve the natural, open space, wildlife, ecological, and environmental qualities of the properties and specifically prohibit the mining or
extraction of sand, gravel, rock, or any other mineral.
50. This is the total value of the easements divided by the total acres encumbered ($149,051/162 = $920).
51. This is the percent by which the three easements collectively reduced the value of the properties ($224,051/$149,051 = 67).
52. This is the difference between the before- and after-values, reduced by $70,000, which is the amount the court determined that the donation of the
easement enhanced the value of other property owned by the taxpayer.
53. The property consisted of two parcels.
54. One residence was permitted on each parcel.
55. The IRS did not assert an increased deficiency despite the lower value its expert asserted for the easement at trial, and the court sustained the
original deficiency rather than coming up with its own value for the easement or accepting the lower value asserted by the IRS at trial. The court noted, however,
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56. This is the difference between the before- and after-values, reduced by $300,000, which is the amount the court determined that the donation of the
easement enhanced the value of other property owned by the taxpayer.
57. The easement encumbered 8 of the 20 acres owned by the taxpayer.
58. The court did not indicate the before- or after-values of the subject property in the opinion.
59. The IRS did not assert an increased deficiency despite the lower value its expert asserted for the easement at trial, and the court sustained the
original deficiency rather than coming up with its own value for the easement or accepting the lower value asserted by the IRS at trial.
60. The court did not address the before and after HBUs or values because the parties stipulated that the easement had a value of $80,000.
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